Joint Doctrine Note 1-15

Operation Assessment

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PREFACE

1. Scope

The focus of this joint doctrine Note (JDN) is to elaborate on specific assessment fundamentals and articulate how operation assessment is initiated during joint planning and executed throughout operations.

2. Purpose

A JDN is a publication that is intended to facilitate information-sharing on problems and potential solutions as a supporting effort of formal joint doctrine development and revision. It provides a short term bridging solution to potential doctrine gaps. This JDN resulted from a special study conducted by the Joint Doctrine Analysis Division, which concluded that "current assessment doctrine does not provide sufficient guidance and procedures on how to evaluate progress toward achieving objectives, creating desired conditions and accomplishing tasks during joint operations." The Joint Doctrine Development Community (JDDC) voted at the November 2013 Joint Doctrine Planning Conference to develop a JDN about operation assessments, in an attempt to bridge the perceived gap in doctrine. This JDN endeavors to define the term "operation assessment" in joint doctrine and to standardize a notional operation assessment framework. It also seeks to provide staffs with a logical roadmap that better describes how to plan and execute operation assessments. This document was developed using current joint doctrine, extant procedures from the different combatant commands, and multiple other assessment publications (e.g., Commander's Handbook for Assessment Planning and Execution, [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] NATO Operations Assessment, the Air Land Sea Application Center's Operation Assessment multi-service tactics, techniques and procedures). Although this JDN does not necessarily describe a position of consensus across the joint force, the intent is to socialize assessment-related information and procedures in a non-authoritative document that commanders and staffs can use, as appropriate.

3. Application

The guidance in this JDN is not authoritative. If conflicts arise between the contents of this JDN and the contents of a Joint Publication (JP), the JP will take precedence for the activities of joint forces, unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) provides more current and specific guidance. This JDN will, at a minimum, assist in the

development and revision of other JPs, specifically JP 3-0 and JP 5-0, and may become a stand-alone publication, if deemed necessary by the JDDC and approved by the CJCS.

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Operation Assessment Overview

Introduction

Operation assessment is an integral part of any operation, fulfilling the critical and necessary requirement for mission examination and analysis. **Commanders, assisted by their staffs and subordinate commanders, along with interagency and multinational partners and other stakeholders, should continually monitor the operational environment (OE) and assess the progress of the operation toward the desired end state.**

Key Term

Operation Assessment: A continuous process that supports decision making by measuring the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective.

The focus of this joint doctrine note is to elaborate on specific assessment fundamentals and articulate how

operation assessment is initiated during joint planning and executed throughout operations.

Operation Assessment and Joint Operations

Operation assessment enhances decision making by identifying and analyzing gaps, risks/opportunities, and trends in the current operation.

Operation assessment requires an integrated approach to support commander decision making regarding the implementation and resourcing of operations to accomplish strategic objectives.

A continuous discourse among the joint force at all echelons provides the feedback the senior leadership needs to appropriately adapt operations to the current situation.

Purpose of Operation Assessment in Joint Operations

The purpose of operation assessment is to enhance the commander's decision making and support more judicious allocation of resources in order to make operations more effective.

Operation assessment provides information about the current state of the OE, the progress of the campaign or operation, and recommendations to mitigate discrepancies between the actual and predicted progress.

The start of the operation assessment should coincide with the initiation of joint planning for an operation. As such, assessment team personnel should be integral members of the operational planning team.

Operation Assessment and the Commander

The primary users of operation assessment are the commander and the staff. Assessment recommendations should facilitate the commander's decision making and consider what kinds of decisions the commander will have to make in order to achieve objectives and attain the end state.

Organizing for Operation Assessment

Operation assessment requires integration and feedback mechanisms within an organization's battle rhythm to inform decisions and address necessary shifts in plans, orders, and guidance. Typically, a range of cross functional expertise is required to analyze progress toward the desired effects, objectives, and end state.

In order to realize the maximum potential, operation assessment should be a coequal function within the staff to plans and operations.

Use of Operation Assessment

Effective operation assessments link the employment of forces and resources to intelligence assessments of the OE.

Operation assessment uses a structured framework to organize, analyze, and communicate information over the duration of the operation. The data collected can help the commander and staff understand the OE and how military actions contributed to the success or failure of a mission.

Operation Assessment Framework

General

The operation assessment framework is the basic conceptual structure for planning and executing operation assessments.

Key Term

Operation Assessment Framework: The conceptual structure for the operation assessment, to organize the data, analyze the data, and communicate recommendations to a decision maker.

Functions of the Operation Assessment Framework

Organize the Data: Organizing the data involves identifying and gathering the appropriate data needed to assess progress from current conditions to desired conditions.

Data associated with the OE may be organized by a variety of different approaches, including end state, phase, geography (i.e., purpose, time, and space), or a combination of these approaches.

Analyze the Data: Having organized the data, the assessment team must now address its meaning. Analysis seeks to identify operationally significant trends and changes to the OE and the trajectory of the operation.

Measures and indicators identified and collected during data organization should now be analyzed.

Communicate the Assessment: The commander has numerous sources of information to support decision making, including assessment products.

Staffs should strive to align their efforts when communicating assessment results and recommendations. Inclusion of various staff products may gain efficiencies by possibly eliminating duplicative briefings and decision boards.

Operation Assessment Steps

Operation assessment occurs during planning and execution. Operation assessment supports the clear definition of tasks, objectives, and end states, and gives the staff a method for selecting the information and intelligence requirements (including commander's critical information requirements) that best support decision making.

Step 1. Identify information and Intelligence Requirements

During planning, a baseline understanding assists the commander and staff in setting goals, if required, for desired rates of change within the OE and thresholds for success and failure. This focuses information and intelligence requirements on answering specific questions relating to the desired outcomes of the plan.

Step 2. Develop/Modify the Assessment Plan

The assessment plan should link information and intelligence requirements to appropriate measures and indicators. It should also contain a data collection plan, including responsibilities, to gather the appropriate data.

Step 3. Collect Information and Intelligence

During mission execution, the joint force uses the collection plan and defined reporting procedures to gather information about the OE and the joint force's actions as part of normal command and control activities. In accordance with the assessment plan, the assessment team assists the planning, operations, and intelligence staff with determining the presence of decision-point triggers and coordinates assessment activities across the staff.

Step 4. Conduct Event Based and/or Periodic Assessment

Often, operation assessments have two components: event based assessments and periodic assessments. Commands will typically conduct both types of assessment in the course of an operation, particularly in counterinsurgency and stability operations requiring prolonged timelines.

Step 5. Provide Feedback and Recommendations

Assessment reports serve the functions of informing the commander about current and anticipated conditions within the OE, provide accountability to higher authority, evaluate the ability of the joint force to impact the OE, and communicate progress to multiple partners in multinational operations.

Iterative Nature of Operation Assessment

Once feedback and recommendations have been provided, the commander will provide additional guidance (e.g., operational approach, desired end state, objectives) that may require updates or modifications to the assessment plan. Until the end state has been achieved, the assessment team repeats the steps of operation assessment based on the commander's updated guidance and changes to the OE.

Developing the Assessment Plan

General

Developing an assessment plan should begin when the commander and staff consider (or develop) the desired end state and begin determining the operation's objectives, effects, and tasks. The assessment team can provide valuable insight in what to measure and how to measure it in order to determine progress toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or achieving an objective. Early and continuous involvement of the assessment team in joint planning helps to ensure operation assessment is an integral part of the overall plan.

Assessment Planning Steps

Step 1. Gather Tools and Assessment Data

Staffs begin updating their estimates and gather the tools necessary for mission analysis and continued planning. Specific tools and information gathered regarding assessment include: the higher headquarters' plan or order,

including the assessment annex if available; if replacing a unit, any current assessment products; relevant assessment products (classified or open source) produced by civilian and military organizations; the identification of potential data sources, including academic institutions and civilian subject matter experts.

Step 2. Understand Current and Desired Conditions

The staff section charged with responsibility for the assessment plan identifies each specific desired condition mentioned in the commander's intent. These individual conditions provide focus for the overall assessment of the operation. If the conditions that define the end state change during the planning process, the staff updates these changes for the assessment plan.

Step 3. Develop Assessment Measures and Indicators

An assessment plan should focus on measuring changes in the OE and whether desired conditions are being attained while continually monitoring and evaluating assumptions to validate or invalidate them. Measures developed during joint planning and revised during execution facilitate this effort.

Step 4. Develop the Collection Plan

Each indicator is needed to help answer either an intelligence or information requirement. The source for each indicator is identified in the assessment plan along with the staff element responsible for gathering it.

Step 5. Assign Responsibilities for Conducting Analysis and Generating Recommendations

In addition to gathering specific data, elements of the staff should be assigned responsibility for analyzing assessment data and developing recommendations.

Step 6. Identify Feedback Mechanisms

The assessment plan should identify the best mechanisms (e.g., assessment reports, presentations, briefs, meetings) and frequency to communicate the findings and recommendations from the operation assessment.

Assessment Planning and the Joint Operation Planning Process

It is critical for the assessment team to be involved in the earliest stages of planning to ensure operation assessment supports the intent and operational approach provided in the commander's initial planning guidance. This guidance drives staff planning efforts during the JOPP.

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CHAPTER I
OPERATION ASSESSMENT OVERVIEW

SECTION A: GENERAL

1. Introduction

a. Operation assessment is an integral part of any operation, fulfilling the critical and necessary requirement for mission examination and analysis. **Commanders, assisted by their staffs and subordinate commanders, along with interagency and multinational partners and other stakeholders, should continually monitor the operational environment (OE) and assess the progress of the operation toward the desired end state.** Based on assessment results and recommendations, commanders direct adjustments, thus ensuring the operation remains focused on accomplishing the mission. Operation assessment is applicable across the range of military operations. It offers perspective and insight, and provides the opportunity for correction, adaptation, and thoughtful results-oriented learning.

KEY TERM

Operation Assessment: A continuous process that supports decision making by measuring the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective.

b. Commanders maintain a personal sense of the progress for the operation or campaign, which is shaped by interactions that the staff may not have access to, such as conversations with higher and lower commanders, and key leader engagements. This requires that the commander gives clear guidance concerning assessment throughout design and planning, and that a mechanism exists for the commander to keep the staff current on required changes.

c. The focus of this joint doctrine note (JDN) is to elaborate on specific assessment fundamentals and articulate how operation assessment is initiated during joint planning and executed throughout operations.

2. Tenets of Operation Assessment

The following tenets should guide the commander and the staff throughout operation assessment:

a. **Commander Centricity.** The commander's involvement in operation assessment is essential. The assessment plan should focus on the information and intelligence that directly support the commander's decision making.

b. **Subordinate Commander Involvement.** Assessments are more effective when used to support conversations between commanders at different echelons. Operation assessments link echelons of command by identifying the activities and impacts critical to

success and sharing the assessment methods used to shape operational decisions. A common understanding of operational priorities allows subordinate commanders to directly communicate their most relevant information.

c. **Staff Integration** is crucial to planning and executing effective assessments. Operation assessment is the responsibility of commanders, planners, and operators at every level and not the sole work of an individual advisor, committee, or assessment entity. It is nested within the planning process, and integrates roles across the staff. Properly structured, operation assessments enable the staff to examine and understand how actions are related. Integrating perspectives from across the staff should minimize errors that arise from limited focus (i.e., duplication of effort, incorrect identification of causes, or insufficient information to prioritize issues by level of impact).

d. **Integration into the Planning Process and Battle Rhythm.** To deliver information at the right time, the operation assessment should be synchronized with the commander's decision cycle. The assessment planning steps occur concurrently with the joint operation planning process (JOPP) steps. The resulting assessment plan should support the command's battle rhythm.

e. **Integration of External Sources of Information and Intelligence.** Operation assessment should allow the commander and staff to integrate information that updates the understanding of the environment in order to plan more effective operations. To get a more complete understanding of the OE, it is important to share relevant information with the host nation (HN), and interagency, multinational, and nongovernmental partners. For aspects of the operation plan (OPLAN) for which nonmilitary influence has high impact or is not well understood, input from these sources is critical to refine understanding of the OE and reduces risk.

f. **Credibility and Transparency.** Assessment reports should cite all sources of information used to build the report. The staff should use methods that are appropriate to the environment and to the task of assessing a complex operation. As much as possible, sources and assessment results should be unbiased. All methods used, and limitations in, the collection of information, and any assumptions used to link evidence to conclusions, should be clearly described in the assessment report.

g. **Continuous Operation Assessment.** While an operation assessment product may be developed on a specific schedule, assessment is continuous in any operation. The information collected and analyzed can be used to inform planning, execution, and assessment of operations.

3. Operation Assessment and the Levels of Warfare

a. Operation assessment occurs at all levels of warfare. Operation assessments conducted at these levels are interrelated and interdependent. Although each level of warfare may have a specific focus and a unique battle rhythm, together they form a hierarchical structure through which operation assessments interact (see Figure I-1). Typically, operation assessments at the theater-strategic and operational levels



Figure I-1. Assessment Interaction

concentrate on broader tasks, effects, objectives, and progress toward the end state, while assessments at the tactical level primarily focus on task accomplishment. Properly focused analysis and collection at each level of warfare reduces redundancy and enhances the efficiency of the overall operation assessment.

b. Operation assessment works best when supported and supporting plans and their assessments are linked and related to one another. As indicated in Figure I-1, each successive level of assessment is linked to the previous level, either receiving guidance and direction, or providing required information. For instance, operation assessment at the tactical level should delineate how it links to or supports the operation assessment at the operational level. Similarly, guidance at the operational level should delineate the relationship and mechanisms (e.g., tasks to subordinate organizations) by which operation assessment data at the tactical level can be gathered and synthesized into the operational-level operation assessment.

SECTION B: OPERATION ASSESSMENT AND JOINT OPERATIONS

4. Introduction

a. Joint Publication (JP) 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, describes an operation as a sequence of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme. Some operations may entail the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defense, and maneuvers needed to achieve the objective of any battle or campaign. However, other operations, such as peace operations, foreign humanitarian assistance, noncombatant evacuation, civil support, and others may not involve combat. Operation assessment enhances decision making by identifying and analyzing gaps, risks/opportunities, and trends in the current operation. Finally, assessments of ongoing operations may shape future plans.

b. Operation assessment requires an integrated approach to support commander decision making regarding the implementation and resourcing of operations to accomplish strategic objectives. Joint operation assessment provides basic principles to integrate staff and intelligence perspectives throughout planning and execution. It helps the joint force to recognize changing conditions and determine their significance to the progress of the operation. A continuous discourse among the joint force at all echelons provides the feedback the senior leadership needs to appropriately adapt operations to the current situation.

(1) During planning, the commander and staff describe the current conditions of the OE and the desired conditions at the end state of an operation, and identify the barriers that prevent the establishment of the desired conditions. The commander and staff develop an assessment plan to focus and integrate information from various sources to reduce the uncertainty of their observations and conclusions about the OE. This information is gathered and may be derived from interagency partners, multinational partners, the HN government, subordinate commands, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and various intelligence sources.

(2) In some operations, it is difficult to isolate the effects of specific actions. The commander and staff focus information and intelligence requirements to answer specific questions about the planned operation, and they develop the assessment plan using a structure similar to operation planning. The integration of operation planning and assessment links joint force actions to changes in observed conditions within the OE, to support the commander's decision cycle and adapt future plans to make operations more effective.

(3) The written products of an operation assessment clearly communicate the effectiveness of the joint activities toward desired end states, describe risks involved in the accomplishment of the plan, and recommend necessary changes to the plan in order to attain a desired end state. Additionally, assessments help the commander to report observations and conclusions about the impacts of the joint activities and to make recommendations to senior commanders or policy makers.



Figure I-2. Commander's Decision Cycle

(4) Predicting outcomes in complex environments is problematic at best. Conditions change, adversaries adapt, missions shift, and objectives evolve. Consequently, the headquarters should continually reevaluate their developed objectives, effects, indicators and measures. As environmental conditions, political considerations, and operational realities collectively influence the successful accomplishment of developed objectives, the commander and staff must review the underlying assumptions and conditions that provided the foundation for their assessment.

5. The Purpose of Operation Assessment in Joint Operations

a. **The purpose of operation assessment is to enhance the commander's decision-making in order to make operations more effective.**

(1) Assessing is a key component of the commander's decision cycle, helping to determine the results of actions in the context of overall mission objectives and providing recommendations for the refinement of current operations and future plans (see Figure I-2). Operation assessment provides information about the current state of the OE, the progress of the campaign or operation, and recommendations to mitigate discrepancies between the actual and predicted progress. Recommendations should facilitate the adjustment of operations to ensure that the commander's objectives are achieved and the military end state is attained.

(2) Within the commander's decision cycle, "assess" refers to activities that help determine the progress of operations as they relate to overall mission

accomplishment. These activities help the commander and the staff to determine where adjustments must be made to operations and serve as a catalyst for further planning. Ultimately, operation assessment helps the commander and the staff to keep pace with a constantly evolving situation while staying focused on mission accomplishment.

b. A key function of operation assessment is to facilitate a deeper, shared understanding between the commander, staff, and other stakeholders of the operation's progress. Operation assessment involves the entire staff, and frequently includes other sources such as higher headquarters, interagency and multinational partners, and other stakeholders. Based in part on the operation assessment, the commander may decide to stay on the current course of operations, reprioritize missions or tasks, terminate or initiate activities, or redirect resources or the allocation of forces to achieve overall mission objectives. The commander may also request additional diplomatic, informational, military, or economic actions from stakeholders or external partners. If the operation assessment reveals significant flaws in the current approach or plan, the commander can also direct the development of a new operational approach or plan.

c. The start of the operation assessment should coincide with the initiation of joint planning for an operation. Operation assessment input should inform and influence development of the commander's operational approach as well as the development of objectives, effects, and tasks. Assessment team personnel should be integral members of the operational planning team. During joint planning, the staff—assisted by the assessment team (if formed)—should identify information and intelligence requirements, identify measures and indicators, and develop the assessment plan for inclusion in the command's OPLAN or order. Once the assessment plan is approved, an initial baseline of the current status of the operation should be established.

For additional information on operation assessment steps, see Chapter II, "Operation Assessment Framework." See Chapter III, "Developing the Assessment Plan," for an expanded discussion of the development and content of the operation assessment plan.

6. Operation Assessment and the Commander

a. **The primary users of operation assessment are the commander and the staff.** The commander's involvement in operation assessment is essential. The commander's requirements for decision making should focus the assessment plan. The assessment must support the commander's decision process and it should be focused on answering specific questions. If the assessment is not providing the commander with answers to specific questions pertaining to issues of progress, it is not providing value. Below are several examples of venues where commanders can gain assessment information:

(1) Personal Interaction

(a) Interaction with other commanders and personnel.

(b) Interaction with other organizations.

(c) Interaction with host nation.

(2) Staff Meetings

(a) Intelligence and planning updates.

(b) Communication synchronization and civil-military operations briefs.

(c) Planning management board decision meetings.

(3) Assessment Boards

(a) Battle update assessment.

(b) OE assessment.

(c) Operation and/or campaign assessment board.

b. Assessment recommendations should facilitate the commander's decision making and consider what kinds of decisions the commander will have to make in order to achieve objectives and attain the end state. As such, assessment recommendations should not be artificially limited to only those resources and authorities over which the commander has control. Optimally, assessment recommendations should facilitate the commander's ability to provide guidance and directions to subordinates, request additional support from supporting organizations, and recommend additional diplomatic, informational, military, or economic actions to interagency and multinational partners.

7. Organizing for Operation Assessment

a. There are many ways to organize a staff to conduct operation assessment during joint operations. Operation assessment requires integration and feedback mechanisms within an organization's battle rhythm to inform decisions and address necessary shifts in plans, orders, and guidance. Typically, a range of cross-functional expertise is required to analyze progress toward the desired effects, objectives, and end state. For example, at each of the senior headquarters in Iraq and Afghanistan, commanders utilized assessment teams, cells, and working groups to develop the assessments methodology and compile relevant data from subordinate units, their staffs, and interagency and multinational partners to execute the operation assessment.

b. Placement of the assessment team within the staff is a key consideration. The level of access to the commander and the senior staff and the level of freedom to work across the staff will impact the quality of work. Within typical staff organizations there are three basic locations where the assessment team could reside:

(1) **Special Staff Section.** In this approach, the assessment team reports directly to the commander via the Chief of Staff (COS). An example of this arrangement is the Afghan Assessment Group (AAG) within the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) headquarters. Advantages of this approach may include increased access to the commander and visibility on decision-making requirements, as well as an increased ability to make recommendations to the commander as part of the assessment process.

Disadvantages may include being isolated from the other staff sections and, to some extent, potentially being viewed with suspicion by them due to the direct access to the commander and the nature of the assessment function.

(2) **Separate Staff Section.** In this approach, the assessment team is its own staff section, comprising the functions of plans, operations, intelligence, logistics, and communications. An example of this arrangement is the J-9 Directorate at United States Strategic Command. The advantage of this approach is that it legitimizes operation assessment as a staff function on par with the other staff functions, and allows the assessment team to participate in staff coordination and activities as co-equals with the other staff sections. A disadvantage to this approach is that it has the potential to create additional tension within the staff that, if not managed properly, can lead to dysfunctional staff processes.

(3) **Integrated in Another Staff Section.** In this approach, the assessment team is typically integrated into the operations or plans sections and the assessment chief reports to the plans chief or the operations chief. An example of this arrangement can be found in the CJ32 Assessment Division of the CJ3 Operations Directorate of United States Forces Korea. The advantage of this approach is that it tends to create close ties between the assessment team and either the plans or operations teams, but a significant disadvantage is that this approach significantly limits the access of the assessment team to the commander and typically introduces another layer of review (and potential censorship) of the assessment team's products.

c. Normally, combatant commands (CCMDs) and their associated Service component headquarters are robust enough to conduct a more detailed assessment. However, subordinate units typically have a reduced capability to conduct operation assessment. Within some joint operations (e.g., counterinsurgency), additional assessment capabilities at the operational level and below may be required and should be considered when developing unit manning requirements. However, just adding more people to an assessment team will not necessarily yield a better assessment. Having a smaller number of analysts with the right skills is actually preferred to larger teams of people without the necessary skill sets. Also, synchronization of the collection and assessment efforts will help to minimize duplicative efforts among organizations. Planning for these requirements will help reduce unanticipated assessment-related burdens to a commander's staff.

d. The general composition of an assessment team may include a data management cell, a survey cell, and an analysis cell. The data management cell collects, collates, and distributes quantitative and qualitative data. The survey cell creates and administers surveys and polls, as well as collects, collates, and distributes survey results. Both of these cells feed data to the analysis cell and the rest of the command and staff. The analysis cell fuses data from the data management and survey cells, along with information and analyses from other sources (i.e., intelligence assessments, external sources such as media reporting, and think tank reports, and direct staff and command input to the assessment process), to generate an assessment report and any required products.

e. The organization of the assessment team into cells allows for the analysis of both quantitative and qualitative sources of information and provides the analytic support for operation assessment. Additionally, it is scalable. To realize the maximum potential, operation assessment should be a function within the staff coequal to plans and operations.

f. The skill requirements for personnel will vary depending on the function they perform within the assessment team. The following skills should be considered:

(1) **Assessments Chief Skills.** Experience in military leadership and operations, ability to think critically, excellent briefing and writing capabilities, and experience with quantitative and qualitative analytic techniques.

(2) **Data Management Cell Skills.** Strong understanding of, and experience with, quantitative and qualitative analytic techniques, experience with common data analysis software and programs (to include database programs), good briefing and writing capabilities, at least basic programming capabilities, and some experience with, or understanding of, military operations.

(3) **Survey Cell Skills.** Strong understanding of, and experience with, survey and polling techniques and analysis, cultural understanding of the area of operations, experience with common survey analysis software and programs (to include database programs), good briefing and writing capabilities, and some experience with, or understanding of, military operations.

(4) **Analysis Cell Skills.** Strong critical thinking capabilities; excellent briefing and writing skills; experience with quantitative and qualitative analytic techniques; strong understanding of assessment principles, military planning, military operations, and military decision making processes; ability to facilitate structured discussions of contentious issues; and basic mediation skills.

For contemporary examples of how some joint forces are organized to conduct operation assessment, see Appendix B, "Examples of Operation Assessment."

8. Use of Operation Assessment

a. Effective operation assessments link the employment of forces and resources to intelligence assessments of the OE. Properly executed assessments allow decision makers to:

(1) Compare observed OE conditions to desired end-state conditions.

(2) Determine whether key planning facts and assumptions are still valid.

(3) Determine whether the desired effects have been created and whether the objectives are being achieved.

(4) Determine the effectiveness of allocated resources against objectives and whether an increase, decrease, or different resources are required.

(5) Determine whether a decision point has been reached.

(6) Identify the risks and barriers to mission accomplishment.

(7) Identify opportunities to accelerate mission accomplishment.

(8) Develop branches and sequels.

(9) Communicate the evaluation of the plan to the higher headquarters, staff, subordinate units, policy makers, interagency partners, and others as necessary.

b. **Improve Decision Making**

(1) Operation assessment provides information to decision makers to support evidence-based decision making about overall strategy, operation planning, and allocation of resources to missions. Operation assessment identifies whether objectives are met and whether tasks have been conducted as planned (i.e., timeline and resources).

(2) **Operation assessment uses a structured framework to organize, analyze, and communicate information over the duration of the operation.** The data collected can help the commander and staff understand the OE and how military actions contributed to the success or failure of a mission. Properly stored data preserves an institutional memory that can be used to learn from one another's experiences. The data, knowledge, and context gained should be retained so it is available for subsequent analyses, which provide historical insights or test new concepts or capability developments.

9. Challenges in Operation Assessment

a. **Remaining Relevant.** Joint operations are characterized by a complex collection of actors, organizations, priorities and pressures. In order for operation assessments to be relevant and useful in this context, they should meet three equally important aims:

(1) They must be adaptive to the operational tempo and ever-changing context of military operations.

(2) They must make sense to the organizational configuration, process, and leadership.

(3) They must be empirically supported and unbiased.

b. **Dealing with Institutional Challenges.** Within the joint force, operation assessment is usually conducted in a command structure with multiple reporting lines and key stakeholders distributed across many organizations. An operation assessment can have multiple stakeholders (e.g., partner nations, other United States Government

departments and agencies, NGOs) at various levels, some of which have agendas that will not align with the needs of the commander. Finding a balance between measuring mission progress and meeting the various demands of other stakeholders, particularly at higher headquarters, is a key challenge.

c. **Measuring Too Much.** There is a tendency to overstate the number of measures and indicators needed, thus generating huge data collection requirements. A major challenge is to understand how much is enough, in terms of measures and indicators, and to appreciate the significant level of effort required to collect and analyze the data. Lessons learned indicate that more information does not necessarily translate into a better assessment. The actual number of effects, measures, and indicators should be based on the mission objectives and mission requirements and not preconceived notions.

d. **Establishing Reliable Baselines.** Military operations are complex and turbulent and it is often difficult to establish reliable baselines or to distinguish between strategic shifts in the OE and shorter term fluctuations. However, it is imperative to measure progress. Failure to identify a baseline as early as possible in an operation can result in incremental and disjointed data collection and assessment approaches.

e. **Assessing Correlation vice Causality.** Assessors must be careful about making definitive statements that joint force actions caused the observed changes to the OE. There are usually multiple variables associated with any given effect and simply because one of those variables changed does not mean it led directly to the change in effect. Sometimes the assessor can demonstrate correlation between the actions and the effect, but not necessarily causality.

f. **Collecting and Aggregating Data.** There are several challenges to operation assessment that are related to data collection and aggregation. The following list provides a few examples:

(1) Determining data collection methods

(2) Determining data quality and reliability.

(3) Determining the appropriate level of data aggregation.

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CHAPTER II
OPERATION ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK

1. General

a. The operation assessment framework is the basic conceptual structure for planning and executing operation assessments. The framework addresses three functions: organizing the data, analyzing the data, and communicating the assessment to the decision maker. Fundamental considerations include institutionalizing the process within the command and integrating the appropriate portions of the process into joint planning and execution.

KEY TERM

Operation Assessment Framework: The conceptual structure for the operation assessment to organize the data, analyze the data, and communicate recommendations to a decision maker.

b. Using a framework does not imply that commanders mathematically determine the outcomes of military operations. Commanders and staff apply professional military judgment to results of analysis to determine progress holistically. For example, commanders in an enduring operation may receive a monthly assessment briefing from their staff. This briefing includes both the products of the assessment process and the expert opinions of members of the staff, subordinate commanders, and other partners. Commanders combine what they find useful in those viewpoints with their personal assessment of operations; consider recommendations, and direct action as needed.

2. Functions of the Operation Assessment Framework

a. Organize the Data

(1) Organizing the data involves identifying and gathering the appropriate data needed to assess progress from current conditions to desired conditions.

(2) Data associated with the OE may be organized by a variety of different approaches, including end state, phase, geography (i.e., purpose, time, and space), or a combination of these approaches.

(a) The purpose of a military operation is inherent in the commander's desired end state. Planners often organize end states within plans or orders using mission essential tasks, objectives, etc. to illustrate the logical application of measures and indicators as they relate to the desired end state. The end state acts as the starting point from which to distill further objectives and tasks.

(b) Planners often sequence military operations by phases. In this case, planners organize data both hierarchically and sequentially by time. Data organized by

phase may reflect the areas in which the force is simultaneously addressing multiple objectives or end states, and may identify means for describing progress by trends.

(c) Specific geographical regions may define the boundaries for organization of data. Various regions of the operational area regarded as critical terrain may require separate assessments.

(3) Part of organizing the data is addressing its validity. The staff should gather data from credible sources and describe any error within the data. Assessors should apply scrutiny to all data comprising the assessment. For example, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's) *Operations Assessment Handbook* identifies a five-step process to check data:

(a) Data Profiling – inspect the data for obvious errors, inconsistencies, redundancies, or incomplete information.

(b) Data Quality (Verification)—verify the data, paying particular attention to the data that lies outside the expected range.

(c) Data Integration—match, merge, or link data from a variety of disparate sources, looking deeper where independent sources provide different pictures.

(d) Data Augmentation—enhance data, using information from internal or external sources that were not included in the original analysis plan or data collection matrix.

(e) Data Monitoring—look at the history of the data to ensure control of data integrity over time.

(4) Staffs should be aware of the following cautionary notes when organizing data for the assessment:

(a) Availability of or lack of access to data should not drive the data requirements needed for operation assessment.

(b) Data requirements should focus on what needs to be measured in order to determine whether progress is being made toward the desired end state.

(c) Do not ignore hard-to-measure, but necessary, data. Establish data requirements early in the planning process and report shortfalls and associated risk(s) to the commander. The commander should decide whether to accept the risk, reallocate resources to collection, or adjust the assessment plan.

(5) Lessons learned show that assessment plan rationale routinely becomes lost during force rotations. Recording the assessment plan logic in an assessment annex to the OPORD mitigates this risk.

b. **Analyze the Data**

(1) Having organized the data, the assessment team must now address its meaning. Analysis seeks to identify operationally significant trends and changes to the OE and the trajectory of the operation. To identify trends and changes, it is necessary to select from the data those differences that are the result of real changes in the system being monitored, rather than simply noise or normal variation in the indicators being collected. Using professional military judgment, the assessment describes progress or regress toward achieving the end state, objectives, decisive conditions, and effects, by answering the assessment-essential questions:

(a) "Where are we?"

(b) "What happened?

(c) "Why do we think it happened?"

(d) "So what?"

(e) "What are the likely future opportunities and risks?"

(f) "What do we need to do?"

(2) Each question may have several answers that the assessment team must prioritize during analysis. Some questions may be unanswerable. The assessment team should compile answers to the assessment questions into a final report for communication, focused on the commander's end state.

(3) Measures and indicators identified and collected during data organization should now be analyzed. When performing analysis, the following considerations apply:

(a) Addressing performance: "Are we doing things right?" The assessment team should apply professional judgment and provide reasoning based on observations and data concerning the efficacy of each task's completion and addressing any existing shortfalls. It should explain why shortfalls occurred and recommend remedies.

(b) Addressing effectiveness: "Are we doing the right things to effect desired change in the OE?" The assessment team should apply professional judgment and provide reasons, based on observations and data, describing progress toward the commander's end-state conditions, including desired effects and likely future obstacles to success.

(c) The assessment team should incorporate analyzed data into coherent assessment products. The insights gained from this analysis must support the creation of recommendations.

(d) Military operations are inherently human endeavors. Mathematical models may falsely conceal the complexity of warfare, although some may be useful in certain analysis applications. Models alone do little to describe complex, ill-structured OEs and must include supporting context to be meaningful. In any case, the presence of

numbers or mathematical formulae in an assessment does not imply deterministic certainty, rigor, or quality. Thus, assessors should not be compelled to use mathematical modeling unless those models have been scientifically validated for use in the current OE.

(e) Military units often find stability activities the most challenging to assess accurately. Assessment teams should use caution when seeking to quantify data related to social phenomena. This type of data normally requires a sound statistical approach and expert interpretation to be meaningful in analysis.

For additional details on analyzing data, see Appendix A, "Identifying the Data."

c. **Communicate the Assessment**

(1) The commander has numerous sources of information to support decision making, including assessment products.

(a) Communicating the assessment clearly and concisely, with sufficient information, yet without adding too much detail, is a challenging task. The staff should include only the information that addresses mission objectives, goals, and the desired end state.

(b) The depiction of the assessment is **not** the assessment itself. Neither is it data for analysis. A well-designed operation assessment should analyze changes in the OE and the performance of organizations. It is the staff's responsibility to organize and analyze the data, and concisely communicate the assessment results, including recommendations, to the commander.

(2) Lessons learned indicate that the staff should consider the following when planning the communication of the assessment:

(a) The commander's guidance is the most critical step in designing the communication of the assessment. Regardless of quality, analysis is useless if the communication is deficient or inconsistent with the commander's personal style of digesting information and making decisions.

(b) Analyze the command's battle rhythm to determine appropriate interval and venues for the staff to communicate assessment results and recommendations to best support planning, operations, and commander decision making.

(c) Staffs should strive to align their efforts when communicating assessment results and recommendations. Inclusion of various staff products may gain efficiencies by possibly eliminating duplicative briefings and decision boards. It also serves to convey proper context and assure staff-wide dialogue with the commander. Additional products might include:

1. Staff Estimates. Though generally not briefed, staff estimates should be accessible to answer queries. Staff primaries may include estimates when

communicating the portions of the overall assessment report for which they have responsibility.

2. Intelligence Assessments. Since they link directly to decision points, briefing intelligence assessments adds necessary context to the operation assessment products. Intelligence assessments should include the ability to collect on priority intelligence requirements and the progress achieved for each.

3. Targeting Cycle Results and Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List (JIPTL). Targeting results provide contextual snapshots of lethal and nonlethal operations conducted for attendees not normally in the headquarters for daily battle rhythm events. Inclusion of a holistic JIPTL review enables clear establishment and shifting of priorities beyond lethal targets.

4. Commander's Planning Guidance (CPG) and Operational Approach. Though generally not briefed, the CPG should be an accessible reference. Reviewing the operational approach provides the opportunity for an azimuth check to ensure that operation assessment and commander's guidance is grounded in the desired end state.

5. Other Stakeholders and Key Enablers. These personnel are often not present in the headquarters every day. Their attendance provides the opportunity to gain a shared understanding, engage in dialogue, and generally mitigate ambiguity.

6. Subordinate Commanders. Periodic attendance by subordinate commanders facilitates dialogue among the staff and mitigates potential ambiguity by ensuring that key information and messages are not misconstrued during data aggregation. Attendance frequency should be established by the superior commander.

(3) When communicating the assessment, the following considerations apply:

(a) Operation assessment should stimulate dialogue between the staff and the commander. The commander should challenge the staff's recommendations and then provide guidance.

(b) The communication methods that the staff selects are dependent on the information presented and the preferences of the commander. Regardless of the methods, assessment products must be clear and concise, but not oversimplified. Every simplified presentation technique risks losing meaning or hiding gaps in logic. Most of all, it is imperative that the communication method answers the assessment questions.

(c) Assessors must fully document any product leaving the headquarters so it is transparent to readers outside of the organization. When depicting assessment information on a slide, the slide should stand alone with any necessary notes, so if used in another briefing or alone, it does not lose its context.

(d) The assessment team should guard against biases, including those of the commander, the staff, and other stakeholders.

(e) Graphic products frequently display a status and a trend of a measure representing a fact or a judgment. Accurately differentiating between facts and judgments within the assessment product enables their accurate communication. An example of a factual measure is counting the number of unit personnel trained for a task, while an example of a judgment-based measure is the leader's assessment of the ability of the unit to execute a tactical task.

For examples of presentation products, see Appendix C, "Examples of Presentation Formats."

3. Operation Assessment Steps

Operation assessment occurs during planning and execution. Table II-1 shows the operation assessment steps. Operation assessment supports the clear definition of tasks, objectives, and end states, and gives the staff a method for selecting the information and intelligence requirements, including the commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs), that best support decision making.

a. Identify Information and Intelligence Requirements

(1) Operation assessment begins during joint planning when the staff identifies the outcomes that the command desires—end states, objectives, effects, and tasks. Then the staff identifies the information and intelligence required to understand the OE and measure progress toward objectives. Staffs need information (data in context) to understand whether, and how well, planned actions were executed, and they need intelligence to interpret changes to the intended aspect of the OE.

(2) Clearly understood desired end states are critical to measuring progress in any operation or campaign. Poorly defined end states can result in poorly defined plans and assessments. This creates a situation where effectiveness of the operation is difficult to ascertain, and the result is an increased risk of wasting time, resources, and opportunities to successfully accomplish the mission. To address this, the staff should define clear objectives, effects, and tasks. These observable behaviors should be translated into information and intelligence requirements and integrated into the operation assessment.

(3) During planning, a baseline understanding assists the commander and staff in setting goals, if required, for desired rates of change within the OE and thresholds for success and failure. This focuses information and intelligence requirements on answering specific questions relating to the desired outcomes of the plan.

(4) As the planning process continues, the staff develops tasks and objectives and defines, in the collection and assessment plans, the changes they expect to see. Well-defined objectives establish a single, desired result or goal; link directly or indirectly to higher-level objectives or to the end state; are prescriptive, specific, and unambiguous; and do not imply ways and/or means (i.e., they are not written as tasks).

(5) Nonmilitary aspects of the OE may be critically important in some operations. Information derived from multiple agencies, warfighting functions, and subordinate commands may be focused to address specific questions about nonmilitary relationships within the OE. Answering these questions may not always allow the commander or staff to determine a cause-and-effect relationship between joint force actions and a change in the OE; however, it will aid in developing insights into expected behaviors and inform the understanding of the OE.

(6) Assessment questions help staffs determine knowledge and information gaps, as well as gauge the value of the information and intelligence collected. They may also reduce redundant and obsolete reporting requirements for subordinate units. An information or intelligence requirement can either be quantitative (e.g., number of enemy-initiated attacks) or qualitative (e.g., report of progress made during a key leader engagement), but should reliably answer the question that is behind it. In either case, the information or intelligence requirement must be related to the desired outcome of the plan.

Operation Assessment Steps					
Steps/Activity	**Planning/ Execution**	**Associated Staff Activity**	**Personnel**	**Input**	**Output**
Step 1. Identify Information and Intelligence Requirements	Planning • JOPP Steps 1 through 6	• JIPOE • Staff estimates • Operational approach development • JOPP • Joint targeting • Develop assessment questions	• Commander • Planners • Primary staff • Special staff • Assessment team (if established)	CIPG • Description of OE • Problem to be solved • Operational approach • Commander's intent (purpose, end state, risk) • Objectives, effects,& tasks	• Information and intelligence requirements • Assessment team input to objectives, effects, and tasks development
Step 2. Develop/Modify Assessment Plan	Planning • JOPP Step 7	• Gather tools and assessment data • Develop assessment measures and indicators • Develop the data collection plan • Assign responsibilities for analysis and recommendations • Identify feedback mechanism	• Commander • Planners • Primary staff • Special staff • Assessment team (if established) • Operations planners • Intelligence planners	• Refined CPG (see CIPG above) • Approved COA • Commander's estimate	• Assessment plan
Step 3. Collect Information and Intelligence	Execution	• Joint targeting • JIPOE • Staff estimates • IR management • ISR planning & optimization	• Intelligence analysts • Current operations • Assessment team (if established) • Subordinate commanders	• Multi-source intelligence reporting • Joint force resource and disposition information • Operational reports	• Data collected and organized, relevant to joint force actions, current and desired conditions • Information organized for analysis
Step 4. Conduct Event Based and/or	Execution	• Assessment Working Group	• Primary staff	• Intelligence assessments	• Analysis of progress to

	Periodic Assessments		• Staff estimates	• Special staff • Assessment team (if established)	• Staff assessments • Analysis methods	desired conditions, effects on OE • Draft assessment report
Step 5.	Provide Feedback and Recommendations	Execution	• Provide timely recommendations to appropriate decision maker	• Commander • Subordinate commanders (periodically) • Primary staff • Special staff • Assessment team (if established)	• Estimate of joint force effects on OE (draft assessment report)	• Assessment report, decisions, and recommendations to higher headquarters

Legend:

CIPG	Commander's Initial Planning Guidance	ISR	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
COA	course of action	JIPOE	joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment
CPG	Commander's Planning Guidance	JOPP	Joint Operation Planning Process
IR	intelligence requirements	OE	operational environment

Table II-1. Operation Assessment Steps

For more detailed information on developing assessment questions, and information and intelligence requirements, see Appendix A, "Identifying the Data."

b. **Develop/Modify the Assessment Plan**

(1) Developing and refining the assessment plan is concurrent and complementary throughout joint planning and execution. The staff begins development of the assessment plan, including collection requirements and responsibilities, during identification of the objectives and effects. This effort, which is supported by the joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) and staff estimates, continues through course of action (COA) development and selection. Developing the assessment plan is a whole-of-staff effort and should include other key stakeholders to better shape the assessment effort.

(2) A successful assessment plan hinges on the specificity of the end state, objectives, effects, and tasks associated with the operation. The ability to accurately assess joint force actions, as related to desired outcomes, often determines the success of the initial phases of the operation. During plan development, assessors must remain engaged to ensure that the objectives are measurable, in order to provide a means to evaluate progress toward them. If portions of the plan are not feasible, early identification and recommendations for adjustment are critical.

(3) The assessment plan should link information and intelligence requirements to appropriate measures and indicators. It should also contain a data collection plan (DCP), including responsibilities, to gather the appropriate data. The DCP should identify staff responsibilities for analyzing the information and developing recommendations and assessment products as required. Requirements for staff coordination and presentation to the commander should also be included in the DCP.

For more information on the assessment plan, refer to Chapter III, "Developing the Assessment Plan."

c. **Collect Information and Intelligence.** During mission execution, the joint force uses the collection plan and defined reporting procedures to gather information about the OE and the joint force's actions, as part of normal command and control activities. Typically, staffs and subordinate commands provide information about plan execution on a regular cycle. Intelligence staffs provide intelligence about the OE and operational impact both periodically and in response to decision triggers. In accordance with the assessment plan, the assessment team assists the planning, operations, and intelligence staff with determining the presence of decision-point triggers, and coordinates assessment activities across the staff.

d. **Conduct Event-Based and/or Periodic Assessment.** Often, operation assessments have two components: event-based assessments and periodic assessments. Commands will typically conduct both types of assessment in the course of an operation, particularly in counterinsurgency and stability operations requiring prolonged timelines.

(1) **Event-Based Assessment.** As the title states, event-based assessments are spurred by an event in the OE. Events can be planned (e.g., decision points and end states identified in the OPLAN) or unplanned (e.g., earthquake requiring foreign humanitarian assistance). In the case of a planned event, the staff should monitor the OE to determine whether the triggers for the event have occurred. Once the staff determines that the requisite conditions exist for the event, it should conduct an assessment, using the available data, and provide recommendations. Alternatively, for unplanned events, the staff should conduct an assessment to analyze changes in the OE, including any effects on current operations, and develop recommendations for the commander. Commands should be prepared to conduct both planned and unplanned event-based assessments. In general, event-based assessments support the following types of decisions:

(a) Transition of operational phases.

(b) Execution of branches and sequels.

(c) Changes to the allocation of resources.

(d) Adjustments to operations.

(e) Adjustments to orders, objectives, and end states.

(f) Adjustments and changes to priorities of effort.

(g) Adjustments to command relationships and command structures.

(h) Changes to policy (e.g., tactics, techniques, and procedures or rules of engagement).

(i) Changes to strategic guidance.

(2) **Periodic Assessments.** Periodic assessments are typically conducted on a fixed schedule (e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly) to identify the progression of joint activities in the OE against a desired end state and the amount of change from a baseline. There are numerous acceptable methods for compiling information regarding the OE to generate a periodic assessment. Understanding the amount of change that occurs between periodic assessments helps the staff characterize the risk involved in a decision under consideration. It can also help the staff anticipate whether a decision point is imminent. The assessment cycle will vary depending on the commander's decision-making requirements, the operational tempo, and the OE conditions. Periodic assessment cycles should not preclude the staff from generating event-based assessments on demand.

e. **Provide Feedback and Recommendations**

(1) During mission execution, the commander and/or the staff may recognize that the conditions of the OE do not reflect those conditions anticipated by the plans. Based on a current understanding of the OE, a staff can estimate the effect of force and resource allocation, determine whether remaining planning assumptions are still valid, determine whether objectives are being achieved, or determine whether a decision point has been reached. Based on these determinations, the staff may identify the risks and challenges to mission accomplishment or identify opportunities to accelerate mission accomplishment.

(2) The staff, supported by the assessment team (if formed), may be required to develop a summary report with recommendations for the commander based on the guidelines set forth in the assessment plan. Assessment reports inform the commander about current and anticipated conditions within the OE, provide accountability to higher authority, evaluate the ability of the joint force to impact the OE, and communicate progress to multiple partners in multinational operations.

(3) The conclusions generated by the staff evaluations regarding end-state accomplishment, force employment, resource allocation, validity of planning assumptions, decision points, etc., lead to the development of recommendations for continuation, branches, sequels, or conclusion to the current order or plan. The recommendations should highlight ways to improve the effectiveness of operations and plans by informing all decisions, including the following:

(a) Update, change, add, or remove critical assumptions.

(b) Transition between phases.

(c) Execute branches and sequels.

(d) Reallocate resources.

(e) Adjust operations.

(f) Adjust orders, objectives, and end states.

(g) Adjust priorities.

(h) Change priorities of effort.

(i) Change support commands.

(j) Adjust command relationships.

(k) Adjust decision points.

(l) Adapt or modify the assessment plan.

4. Iterative Nature of Operation Assessment

Once feedback and recommendations have been provided, the commander will provide additional guidance (e.g., operational approach, desired end state, objectives) that may require updates or modifications to the assessment plan. Until the end state has been achieved, the assessment team repeats the steps of operation assessment based on the commander's updated guidance and changes to the OE.

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CHAPTER III
DEVELOPING THE ASSESSMENT PLAN

1. General

a. Developing an assessment plan should begin when the commander and staff consider or develop the desired end state and begin determining the operation's objectives, effects, and tasks. The assessment team can provide valuable insight regarding what to measure and how to measure it to determine progress toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or achieving an objective. Commanders and their staffs use assessment considerations to help guide operational design because these considerations can affect the sequence and type of actions along lines of operation and/or lines of effort. Early and continuous involvement of the assessment team in joint planning helps to ensure that operation assessment is an integral part of the overall plan.

b. Friendly, adversary, and neutral actions in the OE can significantly impact military planning and execution. Operation assessment can help to evaluate the results of these actions. This typically requires collaboration with other agencies and multinational partners—preferably within a common, accepted process—in the interest of unified action.

c. Although there is no prescribed format for an assessment plan, suggested formats may be found as an annex to an OPLAN or order. Appendix D, "Examples of Assessment Annexes," contains examples of assessment annex formats used by NATO, the US Army, and the US Navy.

2. Assessment Planning Steps

a. Commanders and staffs should develop an assessment plan during joint planning. A recommended method for developing an assessment plan uses the six steps identified in Figure III-1.

b. **Step 1. Gather Tools and Assessment Data.** Strategic guidance documents serve as the primary guidance to begin deliberate planning. Combatant commanders and other commanders also initiate planning on their own authority when they identify a planning requirement not directed by higher authority. Military options are normally developed in combination with other nonmilitary options so the President can respond with the appropriate instruments of national power. Staffs begin updating their estimates and gather the tools necessary for mission analysis and continued planning. Specific tools and information gathered regarding assessment include, but are not limited to:

(1) The higher headquarters' plan or order, including the assessment annex if available.

(2) If replacing a unit, any current assessment products.

(3) Relevant assessment products (classified or open source) produced by civilian and military organizations.



Figure III-1. Assessment Planning Steps

(4) The identification of potential data sources, including academic institutions and civilian subject matter experts (SMEs).

c. **Step 2. Understand Current and Desired Conditions**

(1) Fundamentally, operation assessment is about measuring progress toward the desired end state, composed of a set of desired conditions, in order to reach these most effectively. Staffs compare current conditions in the operational area against the desired conditions. Mission analysis, JIPOE, and component-level intelligence preparation of the battlefield help develop an understanding of the current situation. The commander and staff identify the desired conditions and key underlying assumptions for an operation during joint planning. Assumptions should be validated as soon as possible during execution. Likewise, desired conditions should be reevaluated as needed during execution.

(2) Understanding current and desired conditions requires acknowledging the underlying assumptions. Assumptions identified during planning are challenged during data analysis throughout operation assessment. If the assumptions are subsequently disproven, then reframing the problem may be appropriate.

(3) Following mission analysis, commanders issue their initial commander's intent, planning guidance, and CCIRs. The end state in the initial commander's intent describes the conditions the commander wants to achieve. The staff section charged with responsibility for the assessment plan identifies each specific desired condition mentioned in the commander's intent. These individual conditions provide focus for the overall assessment of the operation. If the conditions that define the end state change during the planning process, the staff updates these changes for the assessment plan.

(4) To measure progress effectively, the staff identifies both the current situation and the desired end state. For example, the commander provides the end state condition "Essential services restored to pre-hostility levels." The staff develops a plan to obtain indicators of this condition. These indicators also identify the current and pre-hostility levels of essential services across the operational area. By taking these two actions, the staff establishes a mechanism to assess progress toward this required condition.

d. **Step 3. Develop Assessment Measures and Indicators**

(1) An assessment plan may have a hierarchical structure that begins with end-state conditions, broken down into objectives, which are further refined into effects, followed by measures and indicators. Commanders describe the operation's end state in their commander's intent, which identifies specific required conditions.

(2) An assessment plan should focus on measuring changes in the OE and whether desired conditions are being attained, while continually monitoring and evaluating assumptions to validate or invalidate them. Measures developed during joint planning and revised during execution facilitate this effort.

For additional information on developing assessment measures and indicators, refer to Appendix A, "Identifying the Data."

e. **Step 4. Develop the Data Collection Plan.** Each indicator is needed to help answer either an intelligence or information requirement. In some instances, these requirements are fed into the intelligence collection plan and tasked to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. In other instances, reports in the unit standing operating procedures may suffice. If not, the unit may develop a requirement to gather the data. In some cases, data may need to be collected from organizations external to the unit. For example, an HN's central bank may publish a consumer price index for that nation. The source for each indicator is identified in the assessment plan along with the staff element responsible for gathering it. Assessment information requirements compete with other information requirements for collection resources. When collection of data supporting an information requirement is not resourced, the staff will not have that

information available for assessment, and will need to adjust the assessment plan accordingly.

f. **Step 5. Assign Responsibilities for Conducting Analysis and Generating Recommendations.** In addition to gathering specific data, elements of the staff should be assigned responsibility for analyzing assessment data and developing recommendations. For example, the intelligence element leads the effort in assessing enemy forces and the engineering element leads the effort in assessing infrastructure development. The COS should proactively require staff principals and SMEs to participate in the assessment process, including the development of assessment products and the generation of actionable recommendations.

g. **Step 6. Identify Feedback Mechanisms.** An assessment product with meaningful recommendations that never reaches the appropriate decision maker wastes time and energy. The assessment plan should identify the best mechanisms (e.g., assessment reports, presentations, briefs, meetings) and frequency to communicate the findings and recommendations from the operation assessment. Considerations should include the commander's preferences and decision style, who else needs the information and recommendations (e.g., subordinate commanders, staff elements, external organizations), and the best way to disseminate the information. Feedback might include which staff elements or organizations are required and how to follow up on recommendations.

3. Assessment Planning and the Joint Operation Planning Process

a. **End State, Objectives, and Effects.** The foundational element for writing an OPLAN and its supporting assessment is the end state. As a component of commander's intent, the end state provides the unifying purpose around which actions and resources are focused. It is the starting point in the development of subordinate plan elements and assessment criteria. The end state provides the set of required conditions that define the achievement of the commander's objectives. Therefore, it is critical that the planners and assessors specifically address the end state, the supporting objectives, and effects when constructing the assessment. With the objectives and effects identified, the planners and assessors can develop tasks to create those desired effects and determine what measures and indicators are required to measure progress toward the desired conditions.

b. **Operation Assessment in Planning.** It is critical for the assessment team to be involved in the earliest stages of planning to ensure that operation assessment supports the intent and operational approach provided in the commander's initial planning guidance (CIPG). This guidance drives staff planning efforts during the JOPP. The steps to develop an assessment plan, as outlined in Figure III-2, span the JOPP. It is important to note that the nexus of operation assessment and the JOPP is not rigidly defined. The nature of the situation, mission, and staff organization may necessitate addressing various operational assessment activities at different times than notionally described. Processes should be tailored to meet planning variables and operational conditions.



Figure III-2. Interaction of Assessment Planning Steps and the Joint Operation Planning Process

(1) **Planning Initiation.** The commander and staff should evaluate the initiating directive to determine time available until mission execution, the current status of intelligence products and staff estimates, and other factors relevant to the specific planning situation. The commander typically will provide initial planning guidance based on current understanding of the OE, strategic guidance, and the problem. CIPG usually includes a description of the OE, a definition of the problem, commander's intent (i.e., purpose, end state, risk), and the initial operational approach for the campaign or operation. Of note, the intent may also include operational objectives, method, and effects guidance. The information provided in the CIPG initiates operation assessment planning steps one and two (i.e., gather tools and assessment data, understand current and desired conditions).

(2) **Mission Analysis.** The joint force's mission is the task or set of tasks, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. Mission analysis is used to study the assigned tasks and to identify all other tasks necessary to accomplish the mission. The primary products of mission analysis are

staff estimates, the mission statement, a refined operational approach, the commander's intent statement, updated planning guidance, and CCIRs. During mission analysis, facts are determined and planning assumptions are developed. Planning assumptions must be continually reviewed to ensure validity and should be considered as the staff identifies information and intelligence requirements and creates the assessment plan. Specified, implied, and essential tasks determined during mission analysis should be considered as the staff develops assessment measures and indicators. Additionally, because CCIRs are elements of information that the commander identifies as being critical to timely decision making, measures and indicators should be developed with CCIRs in mind. The staff should link the desired conditions, essential tasks, and CCIRs to the initial development of assessment questions and supporting information and intelligence requirements. During mission analysis the staff should initiate operation assessment planning step three (i.e., develop assessment measures and indicators) while the refinement of operation assessment planning steps one and two continues.

(3) **COA Development.** Planners create COAs as potential ways to accomplish the assigned mission, providing unique choices to the commander. Each COA is oriented to attaining the end state and shares the essential tasks identified during mission analysis. COAs are distinguishable by the joint actions proposed to achieve the initial objectives provided in the CPG. The staff, assisted by the assessment team, if formed, should ensure that the objectives are achievable and measurable. Planners often use the SMART (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, and Time-bound) acronym as a guide to developing objectives. As the staff develops COAs, it should consider how proposed joint actions could be assessed, related to attaining the end state, achieving objectives, or creating effects. COA development refines and further develops the measures and indicators that were started during mission analysis. During this step, the assessment team must delve into the underlying reasons for proposed joint force actions. Asking questions concerning the reason(s) for certain actions gives critical feedback about where assessment efforts should be focused and helps the staff develop and refine measures and indicators.

(a) The measures and indicators developed in mission analysis are likely to be incomplete. As the staff works through COA development, it should refine objectives, tasks, effects, and the measures and indicators related to each. Cross-functional SMEs (e.g., fires, information operations, logistics) assist in developing or refining measures and indicators that are most relevant to the desired effects.

(b) At this point in the planning process, the number of measures and indicators is not imperative. Generating a list of possible measures and indicators for each desired objective serves as a starting point at which the responsibilities for measurement are assigned to available resources. Once this list is generated, the staff should start to develop the DCP for incorporation into the overall assessment plan.

(4) **COA Analysis** is the process of closely examining potential COAs to reveal details that will allow the commander and staff to identify the advantages and disadvantages of each. During COA analysis the staff continues to refine the commander's assessment questions, information and intelligence requirements, and

measures and indicators. The staff should also start to identify the appropriate SMEs needed to support assessment efforts, including responsibilities for analysis and recommendations related to each COA. This should be reflected later in the assessment plan after a COA is selected and approved.

(5) **COA Comparison and Approval.** During COA comparison, the staff should highlight any COA that cannot be assessed. The inability to assess the execution of a COA may indicate a fundamental problem with the COA. If this is determined to be true, the presumed ease or difficulty of executing an assessment plan for a certain COA may be an important criterion in selecting a COA. Once approved, the staff translates the selected COA into oral, written, or graphic communications sufficient to guide implementation.

(6) **Plan or Order Development.** During plan or order development, the staff should ensure that operation assessment is an integral part of the concept of operations (CONOPS). Incorporating the assessment plan into the appropriate plans and/or orders is the recommended technique for providing assessment guidance and direction to staff elements and subordinate organizations or requests for key external stakeholder assistance and support. The assessment plan may be included as its own annex, an appendix to the operations annex, or, alternatively, in the reports annex. An assessment plan is dynamic and will adjust during the operation as more information becomes available or the situation changes. However, it must be established before the start of operations and should identify feedback mechanisms to support the command's ability to measure its progress.

Appendix D, "Examples of Assessment Annexes," provides sample format and content of assessment annexes used by NATO, the US Army, and the US Navy.

4. Assessment Planning Essentials

During the development of the assessment plan, the staff should:

a. Document the description of the end state in terms of acceptable conditions, rates of change, thresholds of success/failure, and technical/tactical triggers.

b. Document the selection of relevant aspects of the OE during mission analysis.

c. Develop the commander's assessment questions in reference to desired effects, objectives or end states.

d. Document the development of information and intelligence requirements.

e. Identify tactical-level considerations; link information and intelligence requirements to commander's intent, end state, objectives and decision point.

f. Identify strategic and operational-level considerations; in addition to tactical-level considerations, link assessments to lines of operation and the associated desired conditions.

g. Document data collection and analysis methods.

h. Establish methods to estimate risk to the mission.

i. Establish methods to determine progress toward the desired end state.

j. Establish a method to evaluate triggers to the commander's decision points.

k. Coordinate development of recommendations.

l. Develop a terms-of-reference document.

m. Establish the format for reporting assessment results.

APPENDIX A
IDENTIFYING THE DATA

1. Introduction

a. Operation assessment spans both planning and execution. During planning, operation assessment helps the commanders and staffs develop well-defined end states, objectives, effects, and tasks. During execution, operation assessment helps commanders and staffs adjust operations and resources as required, determine when to execute branches and sequels, and make other critical decisions to ensure current and future operations remain aligned with the mission and end state.

b. Commanders and their staffs determine relevant assessment questions, information and intelligence requirements, and indicators during planning and include assessment-related guidance in commander and staff estimates. They use assessment considerations to help guide operational design because these considerations can affect the sequence and type of actions in both planning and execution. During execution, they use assessment questions, information and intelligence requirements, and indicators to assess effectiveness and progress toward accomplishing tasks, creating desired conditions, and achieving objectives (see Figure A-1).



Figure A-1. Operation Assessment Progression

KEY TERMS

Information: Data in context to inform or provide meaning for action. (Joint Publication [JP] 2-01.3 description)

Intelligence: The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. (JP 2-0)

Indicator: A specific piece of information that shows the condition, state, or existence of something, and provides a reliable means to measure performance or effectiveness. (Proposed)

Measure: A basis or standard for comparison. (Webster)

Data: Facts or information used usually to calculate, analyze, or plan something. (Webster)

c. Estimating operational progress toward the end state is, by nature, inexact. Best practice offers some cautionary notes:

(1) The battlefield is not a controlled and observable experiment. Quantitative data alone cannot explain or capture the complexity of the OE.

(2) Since military operations are nonlinear by nature and the smallest input can have a disproportional effect, the numerical weighting of factors generally offers little insight into the merits of one recommendation or COA over another.

(3) Commanders and staffs should guard against relying solely on numerical rankings or other simplistic methods that can fail to acknowledge the complexity involved in the decision-making process.

(4) Commanders and staffs must guard against overburdening subordinate units with collection requirements that purely support assessment activity. Organizations should measure only what must be measured to enable effective operations, vice measuring everything that can possibly be measured.

d. The discussion presented in this appendix is not the only way to organize the collection of assessment data, but does provide an overview of the various components of the operation assessment.

2. Assessment Questions

a. Operation assessment must have a clear purpose, i.e., “what is it that we want to find out about the execution of our plan?” The staff must be realistic and efficient, and it should be clear about what assessment efforts should achieve and which specific questions would be most useful and relevant. Assessment questions are necessary to

ground the operation assessment in the desired outcomes (i.e., end state, objectives, effects, tasks). They should be:

(1) **Achievable.** What is realistically achievable so as to avoid misinforming decision makers with invalid results?

(2) **Relevant.** What is essential, not just nice to have? Assessment questions should be linked to desired outcomes.

(3) **Useful.** Assessment questions should help the staff to identify intelligence and information requirements.

b. Staffs should develop assessment questions with the commander's direct participation. Some examples are:

(1) **End State.** What is the likelihood of, and what are the risks to, the conditions for the specified end states occurring or remaining stable if military operations are terminated on the specified date?

(2) **Security Conditions.** Has sufficient security been established to sustain stability?

(3) **Host-Nation Security Forces (HNSF).** Can the HNSF (in a specified area) handle local security requirements without joint force or multinational force assistance?

(4) **HN Governance Capacity.** Is there sufficient HN government control, rule of law, and stability to prevent reemergence of an insurgent threat?

3. Information and Intelligence Requirements.

a. Information and intelligence requirements must be related to the desired outcomes of the plan and should be developed from the assessment questions. Information and intelligence requirements then provide a foundation for the development of indicators. Table A-1 compares the perspectives, sources, uses, and results of information and intelligence. These distinctions in external versus internal focus show that intelligence is used to understand the environment, and information from staff and subordinate command reporting is used to determine whether the joint force properly executes planned actions. The operation assessment provides comprehensive internal and external perspective of the joint force's impact on the OE.

b. When developing the information and intelligence requirements, here are some of the questions the staff may ask to determine the value of proposed requirements:

(1) **Usage.** What aspect of the desired outcomes does this information or intelligence requirement inform?

(2) **Source.** How will the required information or intelligence be collected? Who is collecting it? What is our confidence level in the reporting?

(3) **Measurability.** Is the information or intelligence requirement measurable? If the information or intelligence requirement is unavailable, are there other information or intelligence requirements that can serve as proxies?

(4) **Impact.** What is the impact of knowing the required information or intelligence? What is the impact of not knowing it? What is the risk if it is false?

(5) **Timeliness.** When is the required information or intelligence no longer valuable?

(6) **Cost.** What is the cost of data collection to answer the information and intelligence requirements (e.g., the risk to forces, resources, and or mission)?

	Comparison and Use of Information and Intelligence	
	Information	**Intelligence**
Perspective	Internal focus.	External focus.
Sources	Staff section and subordinate command reports, host-nation reports, NGO information.	All-source intelligence, intelligence agency reports, host-nation reports.
Use in Plans	Friendly force information requirements assumptions linking force posture to operations.	Priority intelligence requirements assumptions linking operations to effects.
Use in Assessments	Determines if planned actions are executed properly.	Determines if plan is creating desired conditions.
Result of Assessment	Resource efficiency of the plan.	Resource effectiveness of the plan.
Example of Information or Intelligence Requirement	Allocation of coalition trainers to train HNSF within a specific region. Readiness assessment of HNSF.	Security assessment within a particular region.
Legend		
HNSF host-nation security forces	NGO nongovernmental organization	

Table A-1. Comparison and Use of Information and Intelligence

4. Indicators

a. Indicators refer to a specific piece of information that shows the condition, state, or existence of something, and provides a reliable means to measure performance or effectiveness. Below are two types of indicators that have been commonly used by the joint force:

(1) Measures of effectiveness (MOEs) are indicators used to help gauge the attainment of end-state conditions, achievement of objectives, or creation of effects. MOEs help answer the question, "Are we doing the right things to create the effect(s) on the OE that we desire?"

(2) Measures of performance (MOPs) are indicators used to assess friendly actions tied to measuring task accomplishment. MOPs help answer the question, "Are we doing things right?"

(3) Not all indicators are MOPs or MOEs, but all MOPs and MOEs are indicators.

b. Indicators are developed by identifying the data needed to answer intelligence and information requirements. Operation assessment is an iterative process that depends on accessible data sources and professional military judgment. Judging effectiveness and the degree of progress often depends on establishing trend lines for particular indicators in context with appropriate outcomes. Best practice offers the following considerations for indicators:

(1) They must be collectable, relevant, measurable, timely, and complementary.

(2) They sometimes have an associated threshold of success to qualify observed movement of indicators and effectively rate progress in creating effects and achieving objectives. Generally, thresholds of success are the defined standards associated with the tactical task. For example, we consider an objective seized when forces physically occupy the objective and eliminate or capture all enemy forces. Thresholds of success, when useful, are derived by the staff from desired end-state conditions in conjunction with operations planners.

(3) The staff should make note of indicators that are relevant but not collectable, and report them to the commander. Collection shortfalls can often put the assessment quality at risk. The commander must decide whether to accept this risk, reallocate resources to make data collectable, or modify the indicator.

(4) Data collection plans must clearly articulate the task and purpose for each indicator to the actual data collectors.

(5) Data collection may draw on subordinate unit operations, key leader engagements, warfighting functions and functional estimates, battle damage assessment, etc. Staffs need to understand the fidelity of the available data, choose appropriate data, and prioritize use of scarce collection resources.

(6) Some assessment indicators must compete for prioritization and collection assets. If required, indicators must be coordinated and synchronized by inclusion in the command's integrated collection plan.

(7) Not every indicator is included in the collection plan. Many indicators are integral to operations-reporting procedures. In these cases, subordinate commanders analyze, judge, and communicate the indicator. Effective monitoring of operations reports is required to satisfy data collection in these instances.

c. **Selecting MOEs**

(1) Select only MOEs that measure the degree of achievement of the desired outcome. There must be an expectation that a given indicator will change as the conditions being measured change.

(2) Choose distinct MOEs. Using similar MOEs can skew the assessment by containing virtually the same MOE twice.

(3) Include MOEs from different causal chains. When MOEs have a cause and effect relationship with each other, either directly or indirectly, it decreases their value in measuring a particular condition. Measuring progress toward a desired condition by multiple means adds rigor to the assessment.

(4) Use the same MOE to measure more than one condition when appropriate. This sort of duplication in organizing OE data does not introduce significant bias unless carried to an extreme.

(5) Avoid or minimize additional reporting requirements for subordinate units. In many cases, commanders may use information requirements generated by other staff elements as MOEs in the assessment plan. Units collect many assessment indicators as part of routine operational and intelligence reporting. With careful consideration, commanders and staffs can often find viable alternative MOEs without creating new reporting requirements. Excessive reporting requirements can render an otherwise valid assessment plan untenable.

(6) **Maximize clarity.** A MOE describes the sought-after information, including specifics on time, information, geography, or unit, as necessary. Any staff member should be able to read the MOE and precisely understand the information it describes.

d. Staffs can use the following procedure to develop MOEs.

(1) Start with a desired outcome (end state, objective, or effect). Ask, "How will we know we are achieving it?" If the answer to this question cannot be collected as an indicator, ask more specific questions until the answers can be collected.

(2) The answers are unrefined MOEs. It is likely some of these are already collected. If not, plan to collect them.

(3) Use the answers to define the MOEs.

(4) Identify and examine existing indicators.

(5) Implement new indicators, as required.

(6) Develop thresholds of success for the MOE, if useful, to qualify observed movement of the indicator.

(7) Determine collection requirements.

(8) Select measurement tools.

(9) Begin recording the trend, which also establishes a baseline.

(10) Collect, analyze, and judge data over time.

(11) Determine appropriate MOE communication method.

e. **Selecting MOPs**

(1) MOPs are indicators used to assess the friendly actions tied to measuring task accomplishment. MOPs commonly reside in execution matrices and confirm or deny proper task performance. MOPs help to answer questions such as "Are we doing things right?", or "Was the action taken?", or "Were the tasks completed to standard?" MOPs are important to assessment because assessors are trying to attribute changes in the OE to friendly actions; therefore, information on the accomplishment of friendly actions is critical. For example, if the task was completed to standard, but the effect was not achieved, an assessor will question whether the task assigned was appropriate for the desired outcome.

(2) In general, operations consist of a series of collective tasks, sequenced in time, space, and purpose, to accomplish missions. MOPs are developed and tracked throughout operation planning and execution. Staff elements, including current operations cells, use MOPs in execution matrices and staff estimates to track completed tasks. Evaluating task accomplishment using MOPs is relatively straightforward and often results in a yes-or-no answer provided by a subordinate commander. Examples of MOPs include:

(a) Route X cleared.

(b) Generators delivered, are operational, and secured at villages A, B, and C.

(c) Fifteen thousand dollars spent for schoolhouse completion.

(d) Aerial dissemination of 60,000 leaflets over village D completed.

5. Data

a. **Data Types**. Generally, there are four data types. Knowing the data type is essential in understanding the type of analysis that can be performed, and whether data can be interpreted to draw conclusions, such as the relative quantity and speed of change in the states of the systems of interest. In increasing level of complexity and information content they are:

(1) **Nominal Data.** Data is organized into categories, where there is no difference in degree or amount between category and any ordering by category is arbitrary. Effectively the collection of nominal data is simply a sorting method. For example, friendly forces are categorized by sending nation, e.g., from Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, etc.

(2) **Ordinal Data.** Data has an order, but has no information about the magnitude of interval between data points. A Likert Scale is a common use of ordinal data, where "strongly agree" represents more agreement than "agree", but without specifying how much more. For example, NATO nations, ordered by defense spending, may list the United States first, the United Kingdom second, France third, and so on, but this doesn't explain how much more the United States spends than the United Kingdom or France.

(3) **Interval Data.** Interval data is essentially ordinal data with the extra property of having the gaps between the numbers qualified, or able to be meaningfully added or subtracted. However, an interval scale has no meaningful value for zero, so ratios are meaningless. An example is temperature scales, where 0ºC does not mean that there is no temperature. To illustrate, the average daily temperature in Kabul in June may be 25ºC, and in December, 5ºC; so, while a difference of 20ºC between these months is meaningful, it cannot be stated that June is 5 times as hot as December.

(4) **Ratio Data.** Ratio data is the form of data where both intervals and ratios are meaningful. Ratio data has a natural zero, indicating the absence of whatever is being measured. For example, the number of personnel in the armed forces of NATO nations (1999 figures, in thousands) is United States, 1372; Turkey, 639; Germany, 322; and so on. It is valid to say both that Turkey has 317,000 more military personnel than Germany, and that the United States has more than twice as many military personnel as Turkey.

b. **Data Categories.** In addition to categorization by type, data can be categorized as quantitative or qualitative, and subjective or objective.

(1) There can be misinterpretation of these four terms; therefore, the following provides a guide to the terms from an Operations Assessment perspective:

(a) Quantitative: A number that represents an amount or a count.

(b) Qualitative: An observation that is a word, a sentence, a description, or a code that represents a category (attempting to understand rather than prove).

(c) Objective: Facts and the precise measurement of things or concepts that actually exist.

(d) Subjective: Resulting from an individual's personal opinions, experience and judgment.

(2) Metrics used in operations assessment are described by a combination of two of these four categories, one from (a) or (b), and one from (c) or (d). Any combination of these two factors is possible, as shown in Table A-2, thus, they need to be considered in the way the metric is formulated.

(3) Table A-3 depicts an example objective notionally developed for a defensive scenario.

(4) Table A-4 shows a similar example related to an objective for a stability operation.

DATA CATEGORY EXAMPLE		
	Quantitative	**Qualitative**
Objective	The number of no-fly zone violations that have occurred in the last week	The mandate to enforce a no-fly zone is approved
Subjective	The air component's assessment of the effectiveness of the no-fly zone, on a scale of 1 to 10	Enemy freedom of action is limited by the no-fly zone

Table A-2. Data Category Example

EXAMPLE OBJECTIVE AND ASSOCIATED EFFECTS AND INDICATORS				
Objective	**Effect**	**Indicator**	**Data Category**	**Frequency (example)**
1. Enemy division X forces prevented from interfering with corps decisive operation.	1. Enemy division X forces west of phase line blue are defeated	1. Friendly forces occupy objective SLAM (yes or no).	Quantitative/Objective	Until objective is achieved
		2. Number of reports of squad-sized or larger enemy force in the division area of operations in the past 24 hours.	Quantitative/Objective	Daily
		3. Current intelligence estimate of the number of enemy division X battalions west of phase line blue.	Quantitative/Subjective	Weekly
	2. Air superiority achieved within the corps area of operation	1. Number of air engagements in a 24-hour period.	Quantitative/Objective	Daily
		2. Current JFACC assessment of number operational	Quantitative/Subjective	Monthly

		surface-to-air missile batteries.		
	3. Enemy division X communications disrupted	1. Number of electronic transmissions from enemy division X detected in past 24 hours.	Quantitative/Objective	Daily
		2. Number of enemy division X battalion-and-higher command posts destroyed.	Quantitative/Objective	Weekly

Legend	
SLAM standoff land attack missile (Navy)	JFACC joint force air component commander

Table A-3. Example Objective and Associated Effects and Indicators

EXAMPLE OBJECTIVE, EFFECTS, AND INDICATORS FOR A STABILITY OPERATION				
Objective	**Effect**	**Indicator**	**Data Category**	**Frequency (example)**
2. Medical care available to the population in city X.	1. Medical care for the populace is available.	1. Number of clinic staff at work during battalion surgeon's weekly visit.	Quantitative/Objective	Weekly
		2. Number of patients receiving treatment per day according to the clinic's sign-in sheet.	Quantitative/Objective	Daily
	2. Medical care is perceived as available.	1. Poll question: *Are you and your family able to visit a doctor or health clinic when you need to?*	Quantitative/Subjective	Monthly
		2. Poll question: *Do you and your family have important health needs that are not being met?*	Quantitative/Subjective	Monthly
		3. Poll question: *What medical services are not provided to you and your family?*	Qualitative/Subjective	Monthly
		4. Number of requests for medical care received from local nationals by the brigade.	Quantitative/Objective	Weekly

Table A-4. Example Objective, Effects, and Indicators for a Stability Operation

APPENDIX B
EXAMPLES OF OPERATION ASSESSMENT

Care was taken to preserve the integrity of the original submissions of the annexes in this appendix. Therefore, there are some inconsistencies in terminology and conceptual structure between the annexes and the JDN. These annexes are provided as examples of operation assessment only, and may not accurately reflect what the command associated with each annex is currently using.

Annex A—The United States Africa Command Assessment Process

Annex B—The United States Strategic Command Assessment Process

Annex C—International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) In Afghanistan Assessment Process (Fall 2012)

Annex D—External Enablers

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ANNEX A TO APPENDIX B
THE UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND PROCESS

Like many other CCMDs, United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) uses assessment to inform decisions to focus plans, programs, and resources on achieving US national security objectives. As a result, the USAFRICOM developed a process for campaign plan assessment that incorporates four basic tenets: assemble a team of experts throughout the CCMD to develop the indicators that will be used for the assessment, combine different types of indicators to develop a more complete assessment picture, assign weights on multiple axes of the assessment (i.e., by indicator/effect) to ensure that the assessment matches the CCMD's priorities, and synchronize assessment timelines so the results flow into the Department of Defense (DOD) and USAFRICOM's planning processes.

1. USAFRICOM uses a multi-organizational assessment working group (AWG) approach to develop assessment indicators, which provides the benefit of expert perspectives throughout the CCMD and subordinate commands, including the concerns of interagency personnel assigned to USAFRICOM. This ensures that the selected questions reflect the priorities of the command and its leadership.

a. The AWGs include leadership and representation from each of the seven USAFRICOM directorates, other components (US Army Africa, Marine Force Africa, Air Force Africa, and Naval Forces Africa), the subunified command, Special Operations Command Africa, and the Combined Joint Task Force, Horn of Africa. In addition, they included personnel from USAFRICOM's interagency partners (e.g., Department of State, Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security, and Department of the Treasury) as part of the teams.

b. A multi-organizational working group provides multiple feedback loops—a valuable crosscheck. Assessments provide feedback to campaign planning and vice versa. Operational units of the CCMD give valuable subjective feedback, and objective indicators provide them another perspective. Interagency personnel bring a different perspective, and information from their departments, to DOD.

2. USAFRICOM uses three types of indicators—objective, subjective, and perceptive—to ensure that the assessment is not dominated by one type of data, and truly represents the "big picture." To complement this, they also use data from varied sources.

a. Objective indicators are those that can be answered directly with a number. For example, Africa's military forces are increasingly being called on to assist in peacekeeping operations in other African countries. In assessing peacekeeping operations, it may be necessary to determine how many troops are available in a particular country to conduct these kinds of operations. In such a case, an example of an appropriate objective indicator might be: "How many of the country's battalion have been trained in peacekeeping operations?" If carefully constructed, such an indicator facilitates scoring along a normalized (100-point) scale, and is useful to USAFRICOM's leadership in planning further joint training exercises with African military forces, to

ensure that they meet the standard. Many objective indicators useful for assessment are available via open sources. The World Bank, the United Nations, and the African Union are just a few of those sources available publicly. These organizations measure such things as economic data, corruption data, public perception data, and more—all of which may be useful in the assessment.

b. Subjective indicators are those that solicit an expert's opinion (e.g., a country desk officer, or defense attaché), but the answers are framed with descriptive scoring criteria. Example: On a scale of 0 to100, what is the degree to which human rights norms are embodied in military and security force training? Various experts score differently. In order to ensure consistency, it is necessary to define scoring criteria for subjective indicators. Although the scoring criteria may provide an opportunity for some degree of subjectivity in the response, the definitions associated with the scoring bins minimize that subjectivity. Refining these scoring criteria is a continuing task of the assessment analysts.

c. Perceptive indicators are based on Department of State polling data of local African country populations, thus providing an idea of how the country's population perceives the situation, particularly in regard to the professionalism and readiness of the country's military force. Example: "What percentage of the civilian population believes the country's military keeps them safe from threats from other countries?"

3. The process includes an intelligence overview and assessments of relevant named operations, exercises, and security cooperation activities, in addition to measuring applicable objectives and effects.

4. The command assigns weights in a comprehensive way, so the CCMD's most important priorities are reflected in the assessment.

5. Finally, the assessment process aligns to the USAFRICOM and DOD planning process, so the assessment results are available at the right time in the planning cycle. This way, if the assessment points to a need for a strategy, plan, or operational change, it is easier to implement. In the recent assessment of the East Africa Campaign Plan, for example, this assessment process yielded solid data, providing a firm foundation for actionable recommendations to the USAFRICOM commander. Some recommendations confirmed existing strategy, while others pointed toward a need for modification of strategies at the country and regional levels. The assessment also highlighted capability gaps in the forces as well as partner capability. This assessment process makes it possible to make adjustments to strategy to cope with rapidly changing conditions in places like Somalia. It also strengthens the CCMD's justification for additional resources and capabilities and is used to support command requirements in the DOD's global force management and capability gap assessment processes.

ANNEX B TO APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND ASSESSMENT PROCESS

(The following text is adapted from the United States Strategic Command [USSTRATCOM] Concept of Operations [CONOPS]: [paragraph numbering is NOT consistent with that publication].)

1. The USSTRATCOM Capstone CONOPS states the following: Mission Assessment and Analysis (J9) is principally and formally responsible for assessments. J9 chairs the Command Assessment Board (CAB) and will prepare assessments of mission-type orders, quarterly assessments of campaign execution (in time to inform any scheduled fragmentary orders [FRAGORDs]), and a formal, annual campaign assessment (in time for presentation at the fall Commander's Conference to inform the Annual Order), synchronizing and integrating assessments and resulting follow-on actions across the command to ensure mission success. To the maximum extent possible, assessments should balance qualitative and quantitative analytic approaches to improve understanding of potential adversaries, environmental factors, requirements, and activities—recognizing the limitations of each approach and ultimately focusing on progress toward objectives, rather than conduct of activities.

2. USSTRATCOM J91 is charged with performing the assessments portion of J9's mission. To carry out this mission and ensure that assessments are performed at all the appropriate levels, the J91 Division is composed of three branches: Campaign Assessments (J911), Operations Assessments (J912), and Strategic Assessments (J913). This CONOPS will focus on J912's mission—operations assessment. Operations assessments include the assessment of mission-type orders. According to JP 1-02, a mission-type order is "an order to a unit to perform a mission without specifying how it is to be accomplished." They specify the "what" in terms of objectives (or desired effects), priorities, and intent, but refrain from specifying the "how."

3. Assessment Process: The steady-state and contingency/exercise assessment processes are very similar—they include the same basic tasks, varying only in timelines and boards, bureaus, centers, cell, and working group (B2C2WG). Figure B-B-1 below illustrates the operations assessment process based on an annual cycle. During crisis/contingency operations, the cycle will be compressed, but should still include all the assessment phases. To ensure meaningful, measurable, assessment and analysis products, J912 must be involved beginning in the planning phase, and remain involved throughout the data collection, assessment, and analysis phases.

4. Assessment Task. The following is an outline of J912's tasks throughout the assessment cycle. It is important to note that J912 does not accomplish any of these tasks in isolation. J912 will collaborate and coordinate with the appropriate staff and component entities throughout the entire assessment cycle.

a. Planning Support

(1) Establish working relationships between J9 and outside organizations.

Typical Assessments Cycle



Legend

AWG	assessment working group	JOPP	joint operation planning process
CAB	commander's assessment brief	OPORD	operations order

Figure B-B-1. Typical Assessments Cycle

(2) Inject assessment capability into orders/writing process.

(3) Review desired weightings; assist in weighting development as necessary.

(4) Develop assessment framework – include score threshold indicators or rating definitions for each objective's operations, actions, and activities.

(5) Develop DCP.

b. Data Collection

(1) Leverage relationships during data call – reach out to sources, systems, SMEs, etc. to obtain required data and qualitative inputs.

(2) Store data in centralized database or Excel in "normalized" format.

(3) Begin running notional assessments to validate necessary data was collected—reattack if necessary.

c. Assessment

(1) Once data collection is complete, use an automated analysis/visualization tool to facilitate assessments.

(2) Roll-up assessment based on the direct linkages that were developed during the planning phase.

(3) Compare actual values with planned values, if applicable.

(4) Solicit SME input to provide a holistic view and qualitative inputs to effects, and act as a quality check on results before effect roll-up (i.e., ensure there are no known anomalies in the results).

(5) Identify areas for further analysis or research.

d. Analysis

(1) Investigate issues identified by the assessment.

(2) Analyze the "so what" factor to identify major findings, impacts to operations, and ongoing/potential mitigations.

(3) Be prepared to defend objective ratings/scores and findings.

(4) Collaborate with SMEs to develop recommendations for what's required to achieve objectives.

(5) Integrate with campaign and strategic assessment activities to ensure findings inform senior leader decisions, the Campaign Plan, future operation orders (OPORDs), Comprehensive Joint Assessment, and integrated priority list.

(6) Coordinate with appropriate B2C2WG.

(7) In coordination with J913 processes, support the identification, and subsequent reporting, of mission-level risks necessary for senior leader decision requiring the balance of risk cost with mission execution.

e. Post-Assessment

(1) Determine required adjustments to the assessment framework for the next planning and assessment cycles.

(2) Record lessons learned.

(3) Develop an archive for assessment data on shared drive(s).

(4) Update continuity files for the assessment.

ANNEX C TO APPENDIX B
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE IN AFGHANISTAN ASSESSMENT PROCESS (FALL 2012)

(Although this process has changed slightly since it was developed, the following text reflects the process in place as of September 2012.)

1. At the direction of the Commander, International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (COMISAF), the ISAF strategic assessment process was redesigned in 2011to align it with ISAF's campaign and better inform and enable the commander's decision-making process. To redesign the process, ISAF assembled a number of experts in assessments, including many who had published criticisms of existing systems used for military strategic assessments.

2. The revised process, conducted on a quarterly assessment basis, was built to get important information on the most pressing issues in front of COMISAF. To ensure that the new paradigm was holistic, the AAG concluded that it must contain two components: a campaign assessment, focused on assessing progress in the execution of the ISAF OPLAN; and a strategic assessment, focused on assessing progress toward our core strategic goals in Afghanistan. To ensure the new paradigm was comprehensive, the AAG concluded that it must not only focus on military operations or the security domain, but must look across four domains: security, governance, socio-economics, and regional relations. Although the first three of these domains had been appreciated in the old assessment paradigm, the AAG decided that the regional relations domain was not adequately addressed. Adding it gave the proper emphasis to this critical aspect of the campaign. Thus, the new process included both a campaign and strategic assessment across the four fundamental domains, designed to assess progress toward the achievement of the ISAF campaign, and NATO and US strategic goals in Afghanistan.

a. The new two-tier structure consists of both strategic and campaign assessments. The former focuses on answering a set of strategic questions in narrative, analytic form to address the strategic environment while the latter uses a set of standards and accompanying narrative responses to gauge accomplishment of campaign tasks. Both tiers capture the current state of the war while maintaining an eye on future challenges and opportunities. The two assessments and their associated processes were designed to stimulate discussions leading directly to decisions by senior leaders on actions they could take, direct, or request. The overall ISAF assessment process is led by the COS and supported by the AAG.

b. The complementary strategic and campaign assessment efforts are designed to provide output required by the commander. The efforts are organized along functional and organizational lines and are fused together to identify key issues that require commander's attention and action. Both of these efforts base their assessments on multiple data and input sources. Input to ISAF assessments on the status of the campaign includes:

(1) Operational reports from ISAF and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) soldiers on the ground.

(2) Intelligence reports from multiple sources.

(3) ISAF key leader engagements with Afghan leaders.

(4) Open-source information including the media.

(5) Reports from other organizations like the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan or the Red Cross.

(6) Perceptions of the Afghan people as reported by formal surveys as well as informal atmospherics reporting.

(7) Professional military judgment of ISAF's subordinate and supporting military commanders.

c. In the first of the two parallel efforts, the ISAF staff develops the strategic assessment, focusing on describing ISAF progress toward achieving the NATO core goals for Afghanistan. Topics include the status of the insurgency, the development of the ANSF, governance and economic development, logistics and redeployment, and the status of the coalition. At the end of this process, the commander submits this report through the NATO chain of command. **To reemphasize, the strategic assessment is a product of the commander's staff at the ISAF headquarters.**

d. The second effort is the campaign assessment. It is used by the commander to assess the progress of the campaign plan. Each of ISAF's subordinate and supporting commanders submits their individual perspective on the status of the campaign. These assessments use defined standards for each of the essential tasks. Commanders' assessments include both a quantitative rating against the defined standards and qualitative comments based on commanders' judgment and experience to capture the most important aspects of each domain and task.

(1) The AAG designed the campaign assessment to be one in which ISAF's subordinate/supporting commands assessed and reported their progress for each essential task across the four domains using a set of five standards (levels) per domain. An example of a notional set of standards for a single essential task is shown in Figure B-C-1. These standards were designed to be simple, high-level, declarative statements about the most important aspects of each domain and task.

(2) They were specifically not designed to try and capture all of the nuances or details of each command's viewpoint; to do that, the AAG issued the template and instructions shown in Figure B-C-2 to the commands. Within the template, the space allocated to the reporting of the actual standard level for each domain is quite small, with a set of much larger free-text fields making up the bulk of the template. The AAG recognized that the relatively simple standards could not possibly capture the whole of

Notional Campaign Assessment Standards for a Campaign Essential Task

	Level 1	Level 2	Level 3	Level 4	Level 5
Security	Stated areas are not secured.	Stated areas are partially secured but with significant risk of reversion.	Stated areas are partially secured but with moderate risk of reversion.	Stated areas are partially secured but with minimal risk of reversion.	Stated areas are fully secured but with minimal risk of reversion.
Governance	Key government actors are not present in stated areas.	Some key government actors are present in stated areas and/or their actions are significantly undermining security.	A majority of key government actors are present in stated areas and/or their actions are moderately undermining security.	All key government actors are present in stated areas and/or their actions are minimally undermining security.	All key government actors are present in stated areas and they are actively working to enhance security.
Socio-Economic	Security conditions in/around the stated areas are significantly hindering legitimate socio-economic development.	Security conditions in/around the stated areas are moderately hindering legitimate socio-economic development.	Security conditions in/around the stated areas are having minimal impact on legitimate socio-economic development.	Security conditions in/around the stated areas are having no impact on legitimate socio-economic development.	Security conditions in/around the stated areas are enhancing legitimate socio-economic development.
Regional Relations	Other countries are playing an overall significantly negative role with respect to security in the stated areas.	Other countries are playing an overall moderately negative role with respect to security in the stated areas.	Other countries are playing an overall minimally negative to minimally positive role with respect to security	Other countries are playing an overall moderately positive role with respect to security in the stated areas.	Other countries are playing an overall significantly positive role with respect to security in the stated areas.

Figure B-C-1. Notional Campaign Assessment Standards for a Campaign Essential Task

the OE; thus subordinate/ supporting commands were tasked with choosing the standard that they felt was most representative of their situation.

(a) In the free-text boxes, the commands were instructed to provide narrative justification of why their reasons for choosing a particular standard, along with any positive or negative exceptions to their choice, nuances of their command's thinking or situation, etc.

(b) At the bottom of the template was an ''overall assessment'' free-text field. Commands were instructed to treat the input not as a simple roll-up of their assessments in each domain, but instead as a place to provide their thoughts on the most significant obstacles to future progress for the task, most significant opportunities for ISAF to act on, or other significant items of interest to COMISAF.

(c) Third, commands were instructed to choose the tasks and domains they wanted to rate. The AAG did not want to force commands to rate tasks or domains if the latter were not comfortable doing so, given their specific missions; nor did the AAG want to restrict commands from providing input to a particular task or domain if the latter felt that they were vested in it.

Campaign Assessment Template

Security	Level XX
Governance	Level XX
Socio-Economic	Level XX
Regional Relations	Level XX
Overall Assessment	



Progress Chart

Instructions

Each subordinate/supporting command should complete the assessment template for each of the campaign essential tasks. This consists of:

- Completing the progress performance chart, using the rating levels for each domain. When putting marks on the chart for each domain, restrict placement to the hash marks provided as these correspond to the rating levels (i.e., do not assess "between the levels"). It is recognized that the rating levels and their associated definitions cannot capture all nuances of each command's assessment; therefore choose the "most applicable rating level" and note exceptions (positive and negative) in the narrative fields. Connect the four marks on the progress performance chart to form a light gray shaded area with red outline. Ensure that last quarter's assessment is included in the form of a dark gray shaded area with black outline.
- Providing a narrative explanation of the rating levels chosen for each domain. In particular, focus on justifying the particular rating level chosen along with positive/negative exceptions as discussed above, as well as comparison to the last quarter's assessment and an expectation of future trends.
- Providing an overall assessment narrative highlighting the most important points for the Commander to consider in regards to progress or setbacks in accomplishing the essential task. Recommendations for mitigating setbacks or exploiting successes should be included.

Figure B-C-2. Campaign Assessment Template

(d) Finally, a radar chart (also called a spider or Kano chart) was provided as a means of visualizing the command's chosen rating levels for each domain of each task. These charts consisted of a single axis for each domain, with gradations for the five levels superimposed on them. Plotting the rating levels on these charts provides a qualitative, but standards-based, method to depict the current status and changes that have occurred in each of the domains, for each task.

(3) The other input from ISAF's subordinate/supporting commands was less structured, but no less important. This requirement was for a personal assessment from each of ISAF's subordinate/supporting commanders, written by the latter and addressed directly to COMISAF. This input was required for several reasons. The AAG assumed that the input containing the ratings of the tasks/domains would likely be completed by subordinate/supporting commands' staffs. Given this, the personal assessment gave the commanders a chance to provide their unfiltered views directly to COMISAF. The personal assessment was also helpful in elucidating differences in views among the commanders as to what was working in the campaign and what was not. These

differences could subsequently serve as discussion points for the Commander's Assessment Conference. The format for this input was simple: a one- to two-page letter to COMISAF telling him whatever the subordinate/ supporting commanders wished to say. These letters were sent directly to COMISAF and were shared with the AAG only if the submitting commander did not object.

3. Timelines and associated activities for the assessment process were scheduled around the quarterly Commander's Assessment Conference.

a. Sixty days in advance of the Commander's Assessment Conference, the AAG warned the ISAF staff and subordinate/supporting commands that the data-call for the assessment would occur in two weeks.

b. Forty-five days in advance, the AAG issued a FRAGORD to the staff and commands to answer the strategic questions and provide ratings and justifications for the OPLAN essential tasks, respectively, within two weeks.

c. Thirty days in advance, the assessment input was due to the AAG, and analysis of the input began.

d. The remaining month proceeded as follows:

(1) The first week was for ISAF internal discussions and consisted of an AWG made up of action officers and a campaign management working group (CMWG) made up of Colonels and one-star General Officers. These working groups culminated in the COS Fusion Meeting, which was hosted by the ISAF COS and attended by all of the ISAF two-star directorate heads. Each of these meetings focused on the ISAF staff's responses to the strategic questions and associated issues.

(2) The second week consisted of an AWG and CMWG attended by both ISAF staff and representatives from the subordinate/supporting commands. These working groups culminated in the COS Integration Meeting, hosted by the ISAF COS and attended by ISAF staff representatives, plus all of the subordinate/supporting commands' COSs. Each of these meetings focused on discussion of the commands' ratings for each OPLAN-essential task and associated issues (note that the outcome of the COS Integration Meeting was the rank-ordered list of issues described above).

(3) In the third week, the AAG wrote the quarterly strategic assessment report (QSAR) and prepared for the Commander's Assessment Conference.

(4) In the last week of the month, the approved QSAR was published and presented at the Commander's Assessment Conference.

e. The first week after the conference was used to write and issue a FRAGORD directing the actions that were decided on during the conference, and the second week after the conference was used to run an after-action review to identify areas for improvement in the next quarterly assessment.

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ANNEX D TO APPENDIX B
EXTERNAL ENABLERS TO OPERATION ASSESSMENT

1. The increasing complexity of the OE has complicated the design and execution of command assessment programs. In many cases, the unit does not have the broad range of expertise required to effectively assess the impact of the command's activities on the key elements in the OE that ultimately affect the success of the campaign. When designing an assessment program, commanders should seek expert assistance from nationally based, deployable assets such as the US Army's Asymmetric Warfare Group, or the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization's Joint Expeditionary Team (JET). The Asymmetric Warfare Group and JET can assign a team of SMEs to deploy and provide an embedded advisory capability to examine specific operational challenges in the OE and conduct continuous assessments in support of unit operations.

a. The Asymmetric Warfare Group provides operational advisors to deployed and deploying forces and assists commanders in developing awareness about adaptations in the ways that both friendly and enemy forces fight, train, and develop leaders, tactics, techniques, and procedures. This awareness is translated into action through direct input into ongoing combat operations and the training programs of deploying elements, both active and reserve.

b. A JET consists of two or three operational advisors with extensive experience in special operations, explosive ordnance disposal, and even law enforcement, who assist deploying and deployed forces. The JET concentrates on hybrid threats that utilize improvised explosive devices (IEDs). JET advisors provide operational commanders with a clearly defined understanding of the threat and proposed solutions for identified problems. They are positioned throughout the force, assisting commanders with expert observations and assessments for immediate action. JET advisors assist and mentor units conducting offensive operations to proactively find, disrupt, and defeat networks while operating in an IED environment, and they assist the integration and employment of materiel and non-materiel solutions to detect and neutralize IEDs or mitigate their effects. In addition, they collect, analyze, and disseminate lessons learned and best practices observed during embedded operations to enhance combat unit proficiency in tactics, techniques, and procedures.

REDUCING THE FORCE'S VULNERABILITIES

In response to an increase of effective attacks against coalition forces (CFs) positioned on forward operating bases (FOBs) and company operating bases (COBs) in Afghanistan, the joint expeditionary team (JET) was directed by the international security assistance force (ISAF) joint command (IJC) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Special Operations Component–Afghanistan (NSOCC–A)/Special Operations Joint Task Force–Afghanistan (SOJTF–A) to conduct threat vulnerability assessments (TVAs) to identify and assess the force protection (FP) systems and processes employed at each FOB or COB.

These initial immediate assessments focused on identifying strengths and weaknesses at each location, and provided the commanders with proposed solutions for all identified weaknesses. The information derived during these initial assessments provided the supported units with a very concise methodology for improving their FP posture and enhancing the overall safety of all personnel operating at each location.

In late 2013, due to the drawdown of CF throughout the Afghanistan Theater of Operation (ATO) and increased reporting of attacks against FOBs, IJC generated a requirement to establish two TVA teams. Two JET members were assigned to support each of the TVA teams (composed of JET, IJC FP, and Provost Marshall's Office personnel) and to assist in conducting assessments of enduring FOBs throughout the ATO. JET support was requested through Combined Joint Task Force Paladin by the IJC senior staff. The teams were focused on the adversary's most dangerous course of action (MDCOA), including vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and complex attacks involving the use of insurgent fighters employing suicide vests. JETs support provided a unique perspective in helping to identify IED threat vulnerabilities, which assisted in the final assessments to identify equipment and methods best employed to mitigate attacks. The assessments were conducted over a six-week period, with all members providing a final FP assessment to IJC concerning the various FOBs' security and FP elements. JET members' assessments were critical in assuring the safety and security of United States (US) Forces during retrograde operations and enhanced overall FP.

In late 2013, due to significant attacks conducted against US Forces and CF in Herat and Ghazni, along with decreasing white space as a result of retrograde operations of US Special Operations Forces throughout the ATO, Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force–Afghanistan (CJSOTF–A), at the direction of SOJTF-A, requested that enhanced TVAs be conducted on each of the District Support Platforms (DSPs) and camps throughout the CJSOTF–A. Under the guidance of the CJSOTF–A command, led by the Director(ate) of Operations (J3), each Special Operations Task Force (SOTF) was directed to create teams to provide TVAs focused on ways to mitigate the MDCOA against Special Operation Forces (SOF) DSPs and camps. The teams, composed of one JET member (already providing direct support to the SOTF), one Explosive Ordnance Disposal technician, and an Asymmetric Warfare Group member, along with the CJSOTF-A FP noncommissioned officer in charge. In collaboration with the Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) Operations Integration Center, Special Operations Forces—Support Team at the request of the CJSOTF-A JET advisor, an initial comprehensive threat assessment was conducted, which addressed vulnerable areas and vulnerable points, IED threat networks, line-of-sight study, etc., to assist in driving TVA teams' final assessment. The JET members, along with the other members of the assessment team, deployed to the various DSPs and

camps to conduct in-person TVAs and provide recommendations. The assessments were conducted over a six-week period. The final JET assessments assisted in driving FP requirements to include recommended systems and equipment to open white space and mitigate potential IED threats. This is an ongoing periodical assessment due to the ever-changing white space with the withdrawal of US Forces from Afghanistan.

From 2011-2012, JET advisors, in support of the Office of Security Cooperation–Iraq, US Mission–Iraq, assisted Force Protection Officers (FPOs) and Regional Security Officers (RSOs) in conducting C-IED-focused TVAs. JET advisors mentored FPOs and RSOs on proven risk management methodologies, which provided comprehensive assessments that assigned quantifiable risk for current threats, critical assets, and vulnerabilities. Additionally, JET advisors assisted throughout countermeasure development to identify viable material and procedural solutions that reduced risks to acceptable levels. This inclusive risk-management methodology was utilized throughout the conduct of multiple fixed sites and route assessments to enhance FP efforts and reduce risks associated with operations conducted in an IED environment. In late 2011, a JET advisor was tasked to support a unit in northern Iraq that routinely conducted vehicle convoy movements of 70 miles, one way, along a single route. Through first-hand observations, the JET advisor identified the highest threat priority, mission-critical assets and the vulnerabilities associated with each. Once completed, these assessments provided a quantifiable level of risk and assisted in the development of named areas of interest (NAI). Once NAIs were fully established, the JET advisor assisted the unit throughout countermeasure development to identify risk-mitigation options. During this phase, the JET advisor realized that primary medical evacuation platforms lacked the fuel capacity to reach the farthest NAI and then return to U.S. medical facilities. The unit resolved the shortfall with the installation of auxiliary fuel pods. Identification and resolution of this shortfall increased capability and reduced associated risks substantially. In 2014, due to the deteriorating conditions in Iraq, the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) contacted the JET headquarters within the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization's J3, to retrieve the TVA conducted by JET members in Iraq. The purpose of the TVAs for CENTCOM was to help with the planning for a Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation, if needed.

Various Sources

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APPENDIX C
EXAMPLES OF PRESENTATION FORMATS

(Adapted from Air Land Sea Application Center Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures on Operation Assessment.)

Assessors can use various ways to communicate assessment information. While not exclusive, below is a list of common practices for communicating information, the appropriate use of each, and some advantages and disadvantages of each. Assessors must take care not to allow any displayed indicator to supplant the objective. In other words, the joint force's objective is to change the OE in support of the end state. The objective is *not* merely to "get a green" on a briefing chart.

1. Narrative

a. The narrative adds context and meaning to empirical information forming the basis of the assessment result. Alone, a well-written narrative answers the six essential assessment questions. However, when coupled with some form of graphic depiction of empirical information, the narrative still answers the six questions, but does so in a manner usually more convincing than the narrative alone. A narrative is the only way to express recommendations and explain risks and opportunities.

b. A well-written narrative is difficult and time consuming to produce, as it requires logical thinking and clear, concise writing skills. It also requires time and effort on the part of the reader to understand and evaluate the ideas contained therein. A poorly written narrative can obscure essential points by providing too much information.

2. Stoplight Chart

a. A stoplight chart uses several levels of assessment to depict the status of an indicator (see example, Figure C-1). The colors typically used are red, amber, and green, which give the chart its name. Stoplight charts are useful because commanders universally understand them, and such charts clearly draw the commander's attention to items requiring it.

b. Often, stoplight charts are a shorthand method of providing judgments about the implications of information that may be quantifiable, such as the amount of ammunition on hand or the graduation rate of a partner nation's basic officer course. In this case, the levels need to be clearly defined and generally uniform across subordinate elements. For example, fewer than five rifle magazines per service member may be represented by amber, or a graduation rate greater than 90 percent may be represented by green. Assessors should define required thresholds of each color during assessment framework development to increase objectivity and provide clear understanding of necessary requirements, rather than developing the color standards during analysis of the data.

c. Sometimes stoplight charts present simple information that is not easily quantifiable, but has a clear order. For example, a unit leader's judgment of the unit's ability to

Example Stoplight Chart

Function	Sub-Function	Value Measure	2007	2008	2009	2010
Governance and Policies	Military and Government Corruption	Minimize corruption index (#).				
	Country Health Status	Minimize infant mortality rate (deaths/1000 births).		NI		
	Political Unrest	Minimize citizens killed or captured by the government.				
	Parallel Beliefs, Goals, and Morals	Maximize education spending (% of government budget).	NI	NI	NI	
Economy	Strong Economy	Minimize percent unemployed (%).				
		Maximize average annual income.				
		Optimize inflation rate (%).				
		Maximize investment climate ranking (#).				
	Private Sector Development	Maximize tourism revenue ($ Million).				
Social Well Being	Poverty	Minimize % of population below poverty line (%).		NI	NI	
	Conflict Between Ethnic Groups	Maximize labor participation rate (%).				NI
	Pandemic Influenza and Disease	Minimize HIV/AIDS infection (deaths/year).				NI
	Life Expectancy	Maximize life expectancy (years).				NI
	Education	Maximize literacy rate (%).				NI
Security	Terrorism	Minimize terrorism attacks (# of attacks/year).	NI	NI	NI	NI
	Size of Military	Maximize size of military (% military per labor force).				
	Defense Budget	Maximize government defense expenditures (% of gross national product).				
	Internet Monitoring	Existence of cyberspace monitoring activity (yes/no).				
	Federal Force Protection Agency	Existence of government antiterrorism/force protection agency (yes/no).				
	Piracy	Minimize attempted acts of piracy (# of attempts per year).				
	Drug Trafficking	Minimize number of drugs crossing the border (1000 Kg Khat/year).				

Description	Frequency by Year			
= Value between 66 -100	8	7	5	8
= Value between 33-66	6	6	8	7
= Value between 0-33	7	8	8	6

NI = No information found

(Adapted from *Evaluation of Assessment Methodology to Support Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa*, Center for National Reconstruction and Capacity Development, July 2012)

Figure C-1. Example Stoplight Chart

accomplish a tactical task as "untrained," "needs practice," or "trained;" or the status of a civil-affairs project as "stalled," "on track," or "complete."

d. Stoplight charts have important limitations. For example, the simplicity of the communication method may be mistaken for simplicity in the system being described, which may actually be complex or ill-structured, or may hide a lack of rigor in the operation assessment. Additionally, stoplight charts are poor for depicting a series of items wherein most have an indeterminate status. In other words, if all items are amber, the commander is not well informed.

3. Thermographs

a. A thermograph is a colored depiction similar to a stoplight, but it depicts progress with slider bars along a single continuum (see example, Figure C-2). Thermographs permit the depiction of

more nuance in an assessment than do stoplight charts, but suffer from the limitation of lacking consistent or objective criteria for precisely locating the slider. Therefore, the thermograph may create the illusion of science, causing decision-makers to think the movement of the sliders on the graph accurately depicts the nuance apparent in the environment, when in fact, it does not. Most trained assessors discourage the use of thermographs, preferring other methods of communication.

b. Thermographs can be useful as a shorthand method to portray easily quantifiable information, but the statement of the actual quantity in the current period, as part of a trend, is probably better. For information that is not easily quantifiable, thermographs suffer from the assessor's temptation to nudge the slider to the right.

4. Spider or Radar Chart

a. A spider chart allows the depiction of several indicators in the same graphic. A spider chart is useful for comparing alternatives based on several criteria when measuring the criteria in the same unit (e.g., dollars or days). If a "best" alternative exists, it will



Figure C-2. Example Thermograph

show as best in all or most criteria, and will therefore be obvious. If one alternative is best in one criterion and another alternative is best in some other criterion, the chart is not as useful.

b. Spider charts can compare planned conditions to what actually occurred. Figure C-3 compares budgeted expenditures in several categories to actual expenditures in the same period. The military use of spider charts to compare several ordinal indicators can depict change, as illustrated in Figure C-4. However, one cannot directly compare across dimensions because depicted indicators are often not of the same units of measure. These ordinal depictions are the equivalent of several merged stoplight charts.

c. Assessors must avoid the temptation to calculate and compare the geometric areas within the lines joining the indicator values, such as the red and blue polygons depicted in Figure C-3. Such calculations are meaningless and contaminate the assessment by skewing the findings.



Figure C-3. Spider Chart Example



Figure C-4. Spider Chart Depicting Ordinal Assessment

5. Geospatial Chart

a. A geospatial chart is used to communicate geographical or spatial data (see example, Figure C-5). Geospatial communication methods can provide nominal information, such as demographics, or they can provide ordinal information on a color scale, such as the status of security at the district level. The use of geospatial communication methods readily draws the attention of decision-makers to areas on a map requiring additional focus. For example, geospatial charts can depict the density of events such as the locations and number of IEDs or small-arms attacks along a specific route.

b. The principal limitation of geospatial charts is that the scale of the map can hide important details. For example, a national-level map may depict an entire province as transition ready, while a provincial-level map may expose important areas within the province where major problems still exist.



Figure C-5. Example Geospatial Chart

6. Graphs

Graphs (line, bar, and pie) provide a method to show information as a picture. Graphs enable easy understanding of trends and relative magnitudes such as the number and types of attacks, or the number of HN forces trained during a specific period. Figure C-6 is an example of a line graph and Figure C-7 is an example of a pie graph.

7. Tables

Tables provide a means for decision makers to obtain quantitative information in a concise format (see example, Figure C-8). Tables are efficient at providing information; assessors can easily include large volumes of information, but this can tend to distract decision makers from the most critical indicators and their implications. Assessors should include a clear accompanying statement of the assessment with every table delivered to a decision maker.



Figure C-6. Example Line Graph

Example Pie Chart Graph



Legend

ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces	ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
INS	insurgents	UNK	unknown

Figure C-7. Example Pie Graph

Sample Table

Operational Category	October 2012	November 2012	December 2012	January 2013	February 2013	March 2013
ISAF SOF Unilateral Operations (Total)	11	19	31	16	2	6
ANSF SOF Unilateral Operations (Total)	39	55	45	28	1	75
ANSF-led Partnered SOF Operations	233	207	140	156	108	132
ISAF-led Partnered SOF Operations	48	25	26	28	38	2
ISAF SOF Advised Operations with ANSF in Lead	47	53	63	76	57	23
Total Partnered or Advised SOF Operations	328	285	229	262	203	157
Total Operations	378	359	305	306	206	238
Total ISAF-led Operations	59	44	57	44	40	8
Total ANSF-led Operations	319	315	248	262	166	230
% of Total Operations led by ISAF	16%	12%	19%	14%	19%	3%
% of Total Operations led by ANSF	84%	88%	81%	86%	81%	97%

Source: International Security Assistance Force Special Operations Forces, April 2013

Legend

ANSF Afghan National Security Forces
ISAF International Security Assistance Force
SOF special operations forces

Figure C-8. Sample Table

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APPENDIX D
EXAMPLES OF ASSESSMENT ANNEXES

Annex A—Example North Atlantic Treaty Organization Assessment Annex Sample Format

Annex B—United States Army Assessment Annex Sample Format

Annex C—United States Navy Assessment Annex Sample Format

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ANNEX A TO APPENDIX D
EXAMPLE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION ASSESSMENT ANNEX SAMPLE FORMAT

(Excerpt adapted from NATO Operations Assessment Handbook, *Version 3.)*

1. Introduction

The success of operations assessment will be predicated on the clear and concise orders set out in the operational plan prior to execution of an operation. ANNEX OO to the operational plan is reserved for the use of Operations Assessment (see NATO Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive [COPD]). This chapter provides general guidance on the information that should be published in any given ANNEX OO.

2. Annex OO Template

The format of ANNEX OO should follow the guidance as given in the COPD, using the NATO standard six-paragraph format: Situation, Mission, CONOPS, Execution, Service and Support, and Command and Signal. The following template serves as a handrail for staff officers to ensure an effective Operations Assessment Annex to an OPLAN, OPORD or CONPLAN [concept plan]. It provides suggested headings and recommended information for inclusion. At a minimum, all headings in the ANNEX should be published at the same time as the main body of the plan. (It is likely that the assessment plan will expand and refine over time and should be updated through the FRAGORD process accordingly.)

ANNEX OO—OPERATIONS ASSESSMENT

1. SITUATION

a. General. *Introduction to operations assessment, its purpose within the headquarters, relationship to the plan and the key references used in the design of the assessment plan.*

b. Purpose. *The purpose of the ANNEX.*

2. MISSION. *A clear, concise statement which states the Operations Assessment mission, with a clear purpose in support of Commander's decision making.*

3. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

a. General CONOPS Assessment. *The general overview of the assessment will be conducted including the MOEs/MOPs, data collection, how the data will be analyzed to develop outputs, where the assessments will be used and what decisions it will support. Include reference to how lessons learned will be captured and the assessment refined.*

b. Operations Assessment Model/Process. *A schematic drawing representing an overview of the process of operations assessment within the command.*

c. Operations Assessment Results. *How will the assessment products be presented? Where and who will use the output from the assessments?*

d. Data Collection Plan. *Reference to how data will be collected using the data collection matrix detailed in Appendix I.*

4. EXECUTION

a. Operations Assessment Battle Rhythm. *How the Operations Assessment will be executed with a battle rhythm and its relationship with the wider headquarters battle rhythm.*

b. Coordinating Instructions

i. Subordinate Command Tasks. *Tasks or responsibilities for subordinate Commands.*

ii. Supporting Command Tasks. *Tasks or responsibilities for supporting Commands.*

iii. HN Requests. *Requests to the HN for support. Identify overlaps with HN assessment capabilities.*

iv. Civilian Organizations Requests. *Requests to Civilian Organizations for support. Identify overlaps with Civilian Organizations assessment capabilities.*

c. Use of Tools for Operations Planning Functional Area Services (TOPFAS) or other Operations Assessment-related software. *How the assessment will be executed using software applications, including databases and assessment tools such as TOPFAS.*

5. SERVICE SUPPORT

a. Finance. *If any service contracts are to be established related to operations assessment, for example polling; detail plans for contracting here.*

6. COMMAND & SIGNAL

a. Command & Control. *Describe the relationship with other assessment cells.*

b. Liaison & Coordination. *Describe how to deal with issues and who the key Points of Contact are within the Command.*

c. Reporting and Timing. *Provide key reports and timing for submission.*

SIGNATURE BLOCK

ANNEX B TO APPENDIX D
UNITED STATES ARMY ASSESSMENT ANNEX SAMPLE FORMAT

(Excerpt adapted from Field Manual (FM) 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization and Operations, *May 2014.)*

ANNEX M (ASSESSMENT) FORMAT AND INSTRUCTIONS

1. This annex provides fundamental considerations, formats, and instructions for developing Annex M (Assessment) to the base plan or order. This annex uses the five-paragraph attachment format.

2. Commanders and staffs use Annex M (Assessment) as a means to quantify and qualify mission success or task accomplishment. The G-3 (S-3) or G-5 (S-5) is responsible for the development of Annex M (Assessment).

3. This annex describes the assessment concept of support objectives. This annex includes a discussion of the overall assessment concept of support, with the specific details in element subparagraphs and attachments.

SAMPLE FORMAT:

ANNEX M (ASSESSMENT) TO OPERATION PLAN/ORDER [number] [(code name)]—[issuing headquarters] [(classification of title)]

References: *List documents essential to understanding the attachment.*

a. *List maps and charts first. Map entries include series number, country, sheet names or numbers, edition, and scale.*

b. *List other references in subparagraphs labeled as shown. List available assessment products that are produced external to this unit. This includes classified and open-source assessment products of the higher headquarters, adjacent units, key government organizations (such as the Department of State), and any other relevant military or civilian organizations.*

c. *Doctrinal references for assessment include Army Doctrine Reference Publication 5-0 and FM 6-0.*

Time Zone Used Throughout the Plan/Order: *Write the time zone established in the base plan or order.*

1. Situation. *See the base order or use the following subparagraphs. Include information affecting assessment that paragraph 1 of the OPLAN or OPORD does not cover or that needs expansion.*

a. Area of Interest. *Describe the area of interest as it relates to assessment. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.*

b. Area of Operations. *Refer to Appendix 2 (Operation Overlay) to Annex C (Operations).*

(1) Terrain. *Describe the aspects of terrain that impact assessment. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.*

(2) Weather. *Describe the aspects of weather that impact assessment. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.*

c. Enemy Forces. *List known and templated locations and activities of enemy assessment units for one echelon up and two echelons down. List enemy maneuver and other area capabilities that will impact friendly operations. State expected enemy COAs and employment of enemy assessment assets. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.*

d. Friendly Forces. *Outline the higher headquarters' assessment plan. List designation, location, and outline of plans of higher, adjacent, and other assessment organizations and assets that support or impact the issuing headquarters or require coordination and additional support.*

e. Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations. *Identify and describe other organizations in the area of operations that may impact assessment. Refer to Annex V (Interagency Coordination) as required.*

f. Civil Considerations. *Describe the aspects of the civil situation that impact assessment. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) and Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations) as required.*

g. Attachments and Detachments. *List units attached or detached only as necessary to clarify task organization. Refer to Annex A (Task Organization) as required.*

h. Assumptions. *List any assessment-specific assumptions that support the annex development.*

2. Mission. *State the mission of assessment in support of the base plan or order.*

3. Execution

a. Scheme of Operational Assessment. *State the overall concept for assessing the operation. Include priorities of assessment, quantitative and qualitative indicators, and the general concept for the way in which the recommendations produced by the assessment process will reach decision makers at the relevant time and place.*

(1) Nesting with Higher Headquarters. *Provide the concept of nesting of unit assessment practices with lateral and higher headquarters (include military and interagency organizations, where applicable). Use Appendix 1 (Nesting of Assessment Efforts) to Annex M (Assessment) to provide a diagram or matrix that depicts the nesting of headquarters assessment procedures.*

(2) Information Requirements (Data Collection Plan). *Information requirements for assessment are synchronized through the information collection process and may be commander's critical information requirements. Provide a narrative that describes the plan to collect the data needed to inform the status on metrics and indicators developed. The DCP should include a consideration to minimize impact on subordinate unit operations. Provide diagrams or matrices that depict the hierarchy of assessment objectives with the underlying MOEs, MOPs, indicators, and metrics. Provide MOEs with the underlying data collection requirements and responsible agency for collecting the data.*

(3) Battle Rhythm. *Establish the sequence of regularly occurring assessment activities. Explicitly state frequency of data collection for each data element. Include requirements to higher units, synchronization with lateral units, and products provided to subordinate units.*

(4) Reframing Criteria. *Identify key assumptions, events, or conditions that staffs will periodically assess to refine understanding of the existing problem and, if appropriate, trigger a reframe.*

b. Tasks to Subordinate Units. *Identify the unit, agency, or staff section assigned responsibility for collecting data, conducting analysis, and generating recommendations for each condition or MOE. Refer to paragraph 3a(2) (Information Requirements) of this annex as necessary.*

c. Coordinating Instructions. *List only instructions applicable to two or more subordinate units not covered in the base plan or order. Use Appendix 3 (Assessment Working Group) to Annex M (Assessment) to include quad charts that provide details about meeting location, proponency, members, agenda, and inputs or outputs.*

4. Sustainment. Identify priorities of sustainment assessment key tasks and specify additional instructions as required. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment) as required.

a. Logistics. Identify unique sustainment requirements, procedures, and guidance to support assessment teams. Use subparagraphs to identify priorities and specific instructions for assessment logistics support. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment) and Annex P (Host-Nation Support) as required.

b. Personnel. Use subparagraphs to identify priorities and specific instructions for human resources support, financial management, legal support, and religious support. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment) as required.

c. Health Service Support. Identify availability, priorities, and instructions for medical care. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment) as required.

5. Command and Signal

a. Command. *State the location of key assessment cells. State assessment liaison requirements not covered in the unit's standard operating procedures (SOPs).*

(1) Location of the Commander and Key Leaders. *State the location of the commander and key assessment leaders.*

(2) Succession of Command. *State the succession of command, if not covered in the unit's SOPs.*

(3) Liaison Requirements. *State the assessment liaison requirements not covered in the unit's SOPs.*

b. Control

(1) Command Posts. *Describe the employment of assessment-specific command posts (CPs), including the location of each CP and its time of opening and closing.*

(2) Reports. *List assessment-specific reports not covered in SOPs. Refer to Annex R (Reports) as required.*

c. Signal. *Address any assessment-specific communications requirements. Refer to Annex H (Signal) as required.*

OFFICIAL:

ACKNOWLEDGE: *Include only if attachment is distributed separately from the base order.* [Commander's last name] [Commander's rank] *The commander or authorized representative signs the original copy of the attachment. If the representative signs the original, add the phrase "For the Commander." The signed copy is the historical copy and remains in the headquarters' files.*

[Authenticator's name]

[Authenticator's position]

Use only if the commander does not sign the original attachment. If the commander signs the original, no further authentication is required. If the commander does not sign, the signature of the preparing staff officer requires authentication and only the last name and rank of the commander appear in the signature block.

ATTACHMENTS: *List lower-level attachment (appendices, tabs, and exhibits).*

Appendix 1—Nesting of Assessment Efforts

Appendix 2—Assessment Framework

Appendix 3—Assessment Working Group

DISTRIBUTION: *Show only if distributed separately from the base order or higher-level attachments.*

ANNEX C TO APPENDIX D
UNITED STATES NAVY ASSESSMENT ANNEX SAMPLE FORMAT

(From Naval Warfare Publication 5-01, Navy Planning, *December 2013)*

The method of communicating the assessment framework to the staff, higher headquarters, other components, and subordinates may vary. One proposal is to include an annex to Appendix C of the base OPORD. Below is an outline of such an appendix. It may also include the assessment organization, offices of primary responsibility (OPRs), and concept for assessment. This example includes objectives, effects, MOEs, measures of effectiveness indicators (MOEIs), and collection responsibilities.

EXAMPLE

Objectives/Effects

Objective 1: Maritime safety and security in the joint operations area (JOA)

Effect 1.1: Regional threats do not impede freedom of navigation in the JOA

MOE 1.1.1: Increase/decrease in regional threat maritime presence

MOEI 1.1.1.1: Number of hostile ships preparing to get under way
OPR: Navy Information Operations Command (NIOC)

MOEI 1.1.1.2: Number of hostile ships under way
OPR: NIOC

MOE 1.1.2: Increase/decrease in engagements with hostile ships

MOEI 1.1.2.1: Number of engagements where hostile ships close to X NM of coalition ships.
OPR: Coalition Task Force (CTF) XXX

MOEI 1.1.2.2: Number of engagements where hostile aircraft close to X NM of coalition ships.
OPR: CTF XXX

MOEI 1.1.2.3: Number of coastal defense cruise missile radars active with coalition ships within X NM.
OPR: CTF XXX

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APPENDIX E
REFERENCES

The development of JDN 1-15 is based on the following references:

1. Joint Publications

a. JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, 25 March 2013

b. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 03 January 2014

c. JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 October 2013

d. JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, 21 May 2014

e. JP 3-0, *Joint Operations,* 11 August 2011

f. JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, 22 November 2013

g. JP 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*, 30 July 2012

h. JP 3-60, *Joint Targeting*, 31 January 2013

i. JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, 11 August 2011

2. Service Publications

a. Air Force Doctrine, Annex 3-0, *Operations and Planning*

b. Air Force Doctrine, Annex 3-60, *Targeting*

c. Air Land Sea Application Center Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Army Tactical Publication (ATP) 5-0.3, Marine Corps Reference Publication 5-1C, Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 5-01.3, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-2.87, *Operation Assessment,* Final Coordination Draft, 2014.

d. Army Doctrine Reference Publication 5-0, *The Operations Process*, 17 May 2012

e. Field Manual (FM) 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, 5 May 2014

f. Marine Air-Ground Task Force Staff Training Program Pamphlet 6-9*, Assessment*, October 2007

g. Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 5-1, *Marine Corps Planning Process*, 24 August 2010

h. Naval Warfare Publication 5-01, *Navy Planning*, December 2013

3. Other Publications

a. *A New Paradigm for Assessment in Counterinsurgency*, Schroden, Thomasson, Foster, Lukens, Bell, September 2013

b. *Assessments of Multinational Operations – Meeting Report*, USCENTCOM and the Military Operations Research Society, November 2012

c. *Best Practices Guide for Conducting Assessments in Counterinsurgencies*, David LaRivee, August 2011

d. *Commander's Handbook for Assessment Planning and Execution*, Version 1.0, Joint Staff J7, Joint and Coalition Warfighting, 9 September 2011

e. *Decade of War, Volume I: Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations,* Joint Staff J-7, Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis Division, June 2012 32

f. *Innovations in Operations Assessment: Recent Developments in Measuring Results in Conflict Environments*, Headquarters Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, Norfolk, Virginia, November 2013

g. *Insights and Best Practices Focus Paper: Assessment, Second Edition*, Joint Staff J-7, Deployable Training Division, July 2013

h. Joint Doctrine Note 2/12, *Assessment,* United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, February 2012

i. *Operations Assessment in Afghanistan is Broken: What is to be Done?,* Stephen Downes-Martin, 2011

GLOSSARY

PART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AAG	Afghan assessment group
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces
ATP	army tactical publication
AWG	assessment working group
B2C2WG	boards bureaus, centers, cell working group
CCIR	commander's critical information requirements
CCMD	combatant command
CIPG	commander's initial planning guidance
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CMWG	campaign management working group
COA	course of action
COMISAF	Commander, International Security Assistance Force (in Afghanistan)
CONOPS	concept of operations
COPD	comprehensive operations planning directive
COS	Chief of Staff
CP	command post
CPG	commander's planning guidance
CTF	coalition task force
DCP	data collection plan
DOD	Department of Defense
FM	Field Manual
FRAGORD	fragmentary order
HN	host nation
HNSF	host-nation security forces
IED	improvised explosive device
ISAF	international security assistance force
JDN	joint doctrine note
JET	joint expeditionary team
JIPOE	joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment
JIPTL	joint integrated prioritized target list
JOA	joint operations area
JOPP	joint operation planning process
JP	Joint Publication
MOE	measure of effectiveness
MOEI	measure of effectiveness indicator

MOP	measure of performance
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	nongovernmental organizations
NIOC	navy information operations command
OE	operational environment
OPLAN	operation plan
OPORD	operation order
OPR	office(r) of primary responsibility
QSAR	quarterly strategic assessment report–ISAF
SME	subject matter expert
SOP	standard operating procedures
TOPFAS	Tools for Operations Planning Functional Area Services
US	United States

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

1. General

a. One of the more difficult tasks in assessment is to understand the terminology that supports it. Other than the basic discussion of the assessment process in joint and Service doctrine, assessment-specific terminology is not sufficiently addressed in either JP 3-0 or 5-0. Thus, the various Service components and combatant commands currently use a number of different assessment terms.

b. It is in the organization's best interests to develop a Terms of Reference document that includes an assessment design and a data-collection strategy as soon as possible. Once a common lexicon is established, it should be used by everyone. Operation assessment within a command typically involves a variety of staff elements as well as supporting and supported organizations. Establishing a common set of terms early in the process should mitigate misunderstanding and improve effectiveness.

2. Terms Commonly Used in Assessment

The following is a list of the most commonly used terms when describing assessments. While not all-encompassing, this list enables assessment-related terms to be standardized throughout the assessment community.

action. The process of engaging any instrument at each level in the in the engagement space in order to create (a) specific effect(s) in support of an objective. (*NATO Operations Assessment Handbook)*

assessment. 1. A continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing joint force capabilities during military operations. 2. Determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective. 3. Analysis of the security, effectiveness, and potential of an existing or planned intelligence activity. 4. Judgment of the motives, qualifications, and characteristics of present or prospective employees or "agents." (JP 3-0)

assumption. A supposition on the current situation or a presupposition on the future course of events, either or both assumed to be true in the absence of positive proof, necessary to enable the commander in the process of planning to complete an estimate of the situation and make a decision on the course of action. (JP 5-0)

baseline. Information that is used as a starting point by which to compare other information. (Webster)

battle rhythm. (Joint) A deliberate daily cycle of command, staff, and unit activities intended to synchronize current and future operations. (JP 3-33)

campaign. A series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. (JP 5-0)

commander's intent. A clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired military end state that supports mission command, provides focus to the staff, and helps subordinate and supporting commanders act to achieve the commander's desired results without further orders, even when the operation does not unfold as planned. (JP 3-0)

conditions. 1. Those variables of an operational environment or situation in which a unit, system, or individual is expected to operate and may affect performance. See also joint mission-essential tasks. 2. A physical or behavioral state of a system that is required for the achievement of an objective. (JP 3-0)

decisive condition. A specified, sustainable, system-state necessary for the successful achievement of an operational objective. (*NATO Operations Assessment Handbook)*

decisive point. A geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted on, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving success. (JP 5-0)

effect. 1. The physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect. 2. The result, outcome, or consequence of an action. 3. A change to a condition, behavior, or degree of freedom. (JP 3-0)

empirical. Originating in or based on observation or experience; capable of being verified or disproved by observation or experiment. (Webster)

end state. The set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander's objectives. (JP 3-0)

essential task. A specified or implied task that an organization must perform to accomplish
the mission that is typically included in the mission statement. (JP 5-0)

evaluate. To judge the value or condition of (someone or something) in a careful and thoughtful way. (Webster)

implied task. In the context of joint operation planning, a task derived during mission analysis that an organization must perform, or prepare to perform, to accomplish a specified task or the mission, but which is not stated in the higher headquarters order. (JP 5-0)

indicator. A specific piece of information that shows the condition, state, or existence of something, and provides a reliable means to measure performance or effectiveness. (Proposed)

measure. A basis or standard for comparison. (Webster)

measure of effectiveness. An indicator used to measure a current system state, with change indicated by comparing multiple observations over time. Also called **MOE**. (Modifies existing term; recommend change to JP 3-0.)

measure of performance. An indicator used to measure a friendly action that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. Also called **MOP**. (Modifies existing term; recommend change to JP 3-0.)

objective. 1. The clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which every operation is directed. (JP 5-0) 2. In context to data and information, based on facts rather than feelings or opinions. (Webster)

operation assessment. A continuous process that supports decision-making by measuring progress toward accomplishing a task, creating an condition, or achieving an objective for the purpose of making operations more effective. (Proposed)

operation assessment framework. The conceptual structure for the operation assessment to organize and analyze the data, and to communicate recommendations to a decision maker. (New definition—consistent with mental model set forth in Joint Warfighter Advisory Group [JWAG#2].)

specified task. In the context of joint operation planning, a task that is specifically assigned to an organization by its higher headquarters. (JP 5-0)

system. A functionally, physically, and/or behaviorally related group of regularly interacting or interdependent elements; that group of elements forming a unified whole. (JP 3-0)

task. A clearly defined action or activity specifically assigned to an individual or organization that must be done, as it is imposed by an appropriate authority. (JP 1)

variance. An amount of difference or change. (Webster)

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JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF